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P R E F A C E
The s tudy  on r e d u c i n g  the  economic dependence  of B o ts w an a ,  
L e so th o  and S w a z i l a n d  -was com m iss io ned  f rom the  In s t i tu te  of 
Development S tu d ie s  by the Commonwealth S e c r e t a r i a t  in r e s p o n s e  to 
a jo int r e q u e s t  f rom th e  G ove rnm en ts  of t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s .
T h i s  F in a l  R eport  on L e so tho  must be r e a d  in con junc t ion  
with the  In te r im  R eport  s in ce  it p r o v id e s  su p p le m e n ta ry  m a t e r i a l  and,  
in some c a s e s ,  f u r t h e r  e l a b o r a t i o n s  of  c o n c lu s io n s  and recom m enda t ions  
inc luded  in the  In te r im  R e p o r t .  The  In te r im  R e p o r t s  of the  t h r e e  
c o u n t r i e s  a l s o  con ta in  a g e n e r a l  s e c t io n  which  d e a l s  w i th  i s s u e s  of 
r e g i o n a l  c o n c e r n  o r  of jo in t c o n c e r n  to th e  t h r e e  c o u n t r i e s .  The 
g e n e r a l  s e c t io n  i s  not be ing  r e p e a t e d  in  th i s  F in a l  R e p o r t .  The 
con ten t  of  th i s  F in a l  R epo r t  r e f l e c t s  the  i n t e r e s t s  e x p r e s s e d  by  the  
Governm ent  of L e so tho  in  i t s  r e a c t i o n s  to  th e  In te r im  R e p o r t .
The  S e c r e t a r i a t  i s  indeb ted  to the  a u th o r s  fo r  a g r e e in g  to 
u n d e r t a k e  th i s  s tudy  and fo r  t h e i r  de d ic a te d  s e r v i c e  and  c o - o p e r a t i v e  
a t t i tude  in comple t ing  th i s  v e ry  w or th w h i le  t a s k .  It a l s o  acknow ledges  
the  a s s i s t a n c e  p ro v id e d  by  P r o f e s s o r  H . M . A .  O n i t i r i ,  who a c t e d  a s  
a c o n su l ta n t  to the  S e c r e t a r i a t  on the  p r o j e c t .  The  v iew s  e x p r e s s e d  
in th i s  R epo r t  a r e  th o s e  of the a u th o r s  and do not n e c e s s a r i l y  r e f l e c t  
t h o s e  of the  Commonwealth  S e c r e t a r i a t .
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I. Ini reduction
T he  In te r im  R e p o r t  to the G overnm en ts  of B o ts w an a ,  L e so th o  
and  S w a z i l a n d ,  Reducing D e p e n d e n c e , p r e p a r e d  by  P r o f e s s o r s  
R . H .  G r e e n  and M. Lip ton  and M r .  P .  Se lwyn of the In s t i tu te  
of Development S tu d i e s ,  B r igh ton ,  E ngland ,  w a s  submit ted  to 
th ese  G ove rnm en ts  by the Commonwealth  S e c r e t a r i a t  in J a n u a ry  
1979. E a c h  G ove rnm en t  r e c e i v e d  ten  c o p ie s  of the In te r im  
R e p o r t ,  dea l ing  with  i s s u e s  a f fec t ing  a l l  t h r e e  c o u n t r i e s ,  and 
of a d e t a i l e d  Annex sp ec i f ic  to i t s  own c o u n t ry .  The  t e r m s  of 
r e f e r e n c e  fo r  the w o rk ,  both  on the In te r im  R e p o r t  and  subsequent ly ,  
a r e  s e t  out a s  Annex A to th is  F in a l  R ep o r t .
In view of comments  and s u g g e s t io n s  from the t h r e e  G ove rnm en ts ,  
it was  dec id e d  that the m os t  usefu l  p r o c e d u r e  w a s  to p r e p a r e  the 
th re e  F ina l  R e p o r t s  (dea l ing  s e p a r a t e l y  w ith  the to p ic s  r a i s e d  by  
e ac h  coun t ry )  in s t e a d  of a f u r t h e r  g e n e ra l  r e p o r t  on a l l  t h r e e  c o u n t r i e s .
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In discussion with the Director of the Lesotho Central 
Planning and Development Office, it was agreed that it would 
be desirable during the present phase of the study to 
concentrate on issues of industrial development, in view both 
of its importance for future job creation and the severe 
difficulties which have been encountered in this sector.
Both the earlier Development Plans laid stress on industrial 
development, primarily as a means of providing jobs. But 
experience so far has been disappointing. According to the 
Census of Industrial Production, 1969/70 - 1975/76, only 
1,712 persons were employed in manufacturing in 1975/76. This 
figure, however, excluded home industries and may not have 
completely covered other industrial establishments.
In Table I we show output and employment in manufacturing in 
1975/76. Even if we make all allowances for omissions, the 
total size of the sector was clearly very small. The table 
shows that gross output per establishment averaged R288,000, 
and net output R106,000; value added averaged 37% of gross 
output. These averages, however, concealed substantial 
disparities; unfortunately the Census of Industrial Production 
does not provide distribution figures for manufacturing in 
distinction from those for construction.
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TABLE I: Manufacturing and Employment Output 1975/76
Number of units 28
Gross output (R'000) 8 ,056
Purchases and changes in stocks 
(R'000)
5,077
Net output (R'000) 2,979
Wages and salaries paid (R'000) 1,162
Numbers employed 1,712
Source: Census of Industrial Production 1969/70 - 1975/76 
Table 2 (g).
*Table 5(g) of the Census shows a slightly different number of p e r s o n s  
employed  in  manuf.icLuring.
The Third Plan Preview estimates industrial employment in 1978 
at 7,500 - presumably including artisan and home industries - 
or 19% of total employment inside the country. It points out 
that, whereas the Second Development Plan had estimated job 
creation in industry during the plan period at 4,500, it 
seemed probable that only 1,300 such jobs would be created 
(both figures excluding rural industries and handicrafts). Thus, 
in spite of the very considerable efforts which have been put 
into industrial growth, the results have been disappointing. 
There would appear to be several reasons for this failure:
(a) Lesotho industry has to compete with industry in South 
Africa's industrial centres. Industry in the existing 
industrial centres benefits from access to large markets and 
the resulting ability to exploit scale economies, good 
infrastructure services (including transport and 
communications), ancillary services and adequate supplies of 
skilled labour and management.
(b) Although SACU in principle provides free access for Lesotho 
experts to the South African market, there are many actual 
barriers in the way - not least market sharing arrangements 
among the more monopolistic industries in South Africa.
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(c) There are also weaknesses internal to Lesotho. These 
include a lack of adequate management, weaknesses in 
financial arrangements and inadequacies in planning 
procedures and infrastructure.
As we emphasised in our first report, economic policy in 
Lesotho is centrally concerned with providing additional jobs, 
with reducing import dependence and with increasing Lesotho's 
ability to pay for those imports which cannot be eliminated 
without a decline in consumption. Industrial policy is 
concerned with all three aims. An examination of industrial 
policy involves several questions. First, what are the 
appropriate industries for Lesotho - that is, what industries 
can most easily be established and survive, and will 
contribute most effectively to the aims of industrial policy?
This range of questions is being examined by Dr. El-Hawary, 
the Industrial Planning Advisor, and will not be considered in 
this report. Secondly, what can government do to improve the 
provision of necessary inputs into industry (materials, skills, 
management, finance)? Thirdly, what can be done to improve 
access to internal or external markets? And, lastly, what 
should be done to improve the administration of industrial 
policy?
I I . Inputs in to  I n d u s t r y
(A) Material Inputs
The e x p e r i e n c e  of o t h e r  a r e a s  g e o g r a p h i c a l l y  n e a r  to l a r g e  i n d u s t r i a l  
c o u n t r i e s  s u g g e s t s  tha t  i n d u s t r i e s  b a s e d  on lo ca l  m a t e r i a l s  a r e  f r e q u e n t ly  
among the f i r s t  to d e v e lo p .  But  such  i n d u s t r i e s  a r e  of m ino r  im p o r ta n c e  in 
L e so th o .  A p a r t  from some u s e  in  a  CARE m o h a i r  sp inning  p r o j e c t ,  v i r t u a l l y  
all loca l  wool and  m oha i r  a r e  e x p o r t e d  in r a w  fo rm .  T h e r e  i s  v e r y  l i t t l e  
loca l use  of a v a i l a b le  h id e s  and  s k in s .  L i t t l e  lo ca l  s tone  i s  u s e d  in c o n s t r u c t i o n .  
But equa l ly  im por ta n t  i s  the l a c k  of lo ca l ly  a v a i la b le  m a t e r i a l s .  T he  l im i ted  
s u c c e s s  of a g r i c u l t u r a l  deve lopm ent  p r o g ra m m e s  m eans  th a t  t h e r e  is  
l i t t l e  b a s i s  a t  p r e s e n t  f o r  a g r o - i n d u s t r i e s .  T h u s  the supp ly  of loca l
cattle will be insufficient to enable the proposed abattoir 
to operate commercially and it will be necessary to import 
cattle from RSA. No other agricultural materials are at 
present produced on a sufficient scale to act as the base for 
any substantial industrial growth. Asparagus, peaches and 
various vegetables are grown - but not on a large scale.
The principal local materials which could in principle be the 
base for processing or manufacturing are wool and mohair. We 
have heard different views on the appropriate size of any 
processing activity. But there is agreement that such 
processing could more easily be made viable if there were some 
assurance that the whole, or at least the greater part, of 
local production could be made available to the local industry. 
There are several possibilities:
(i) An export duty could be levied on raw, unprocessed wool 
and mohair. This, however, could be widely evaded, 
especially if the processing industry paid lower prices
to the producers than they could obtain by selling directly 
to dealers.
(ii) The processing industry could pay a premium over normal 
traders' prices. This need not involve subsidising the 
industry. The returns to initial processing might well be 
sufficient to pay the additional cost. We do not have 
sufficient information on the present structure of the 
trade to say how likely this would be.
(iii) A cooperative wool and mohair producers' society providing 
both credit and marketing services could purchase the 
materials from the producers. A cooperative would, however, 
succeed only if:
(a) the producers saw benefits to themselves in joining and 
in remaining loyal to it;
(b) the cooperative was well managed; purchasing organisati 
in the public sector have frequently been badly managed 
and have imposed heavy costs on the producers.
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We suggest that a cooperative wool and mohair credit and 
marketing society be established as part of a programme for 
establishing a local processing plant. Such a society could 
obtain a share in or even own the processing facilities, and 
would thus be able to pay attractive prices to the producers.
But it would be operating in competition with private traders, 
and would have to be ready to meet that competition in such 
matters as willingness to pay cash, an appropriate distribution 
of buying points, and the provision of credit.
We suggest that technical assistance should be obtained for
(i) setting up a cooperative marketing system for wool and
mohair, and drawing up detailed proposals for a cooperative 
marketing system;
(lii)setting up a cooperative marketing system for wool and mohair 
and running It for an Initial period of, say two years. This 
would include the provision of training for Basotho so that 
the cooperative should be self-sufficient in manpower at the 
end of the period.
We understand that Sweden has substantial experience in the 
cooperative marketing and processing of wool. We suggest that SIDA 
be asked to provide technical assistance in this field, and 
initial financial help until the activity is well established.
Administratively, there is a division of functions within 
government between the Ministry of Agriculture, which promotes crop 
production, and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, LNDC and 
BEDCO, which promote industrial production. But agro-industries, 
which involve both increased output of agricultural products and 
the processing or manufacture of such products, are not the 
specific responsibility of any part of government. It has been 
suggested that the promotion of agro-industries should be the 
specific responsibility of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
But the Ministry has no means of promoting the output of the 
relevant agricultural products.
We would not wish to propose the establishment of a special
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institution for promoting agro-industries; this would be 
wasteful, and probably ineffective. This is, however, an area 
where cooperation among existing institutions should be 
strengthened. We suggest that the Central Planning and 
Development Office take the initiative in establishing a system 
of regular mutual consultation and Information between the 
Ministries of Agriculture and Commerce and Industry, LNDC and 
BEDCO concerning possibilities and problems in this sector.
(B) Management
Nearly everybody with whom we discussed industrial issues 
identified management as the scarcest resource in Lesotho. Thus 
the artisans whom BEDCO is trying to make into small 
industrialists find the transition from hand-worker to organiser 
difficult. Again, financial institutions claim that their principal 
criterion for financing, and indeed the main barrier in the way of 
providing finance for industry, is the availability of good 
management. The LNDC finds that, not only does Basotho enterprise 
suffer from management problems, but South African enterprises 
operating in Lesotho call on LNDC for managerial assistance.
Both the LNDC and BEDCO provide management training, but we 
understand that there are some doubts about its effectiveness. It 
is difficult to train managers outside industry; where there is 
little industry, there are few opportunities for effective 
training. If the South African system were different, and 
permitted the free employment of Basotho at all levels, it would 
be possible to arrange for the training of Basotho within South 
African industry. But with the present policy of the South African 
government and white trade unions, such arrangements are not 
possible. We suggest that the possibilities be explored of 
providing management training in other African countries with 
growing industrial sectors (e.g. Zimbabwe). The Commonwealth 
Secretariat might also be able to assist in exploring possibilities in 
Commonwealth countries in Africa.
(C) Finance
L e s o t h o  lacks a development bank. The First Five Year Development 
Plan provided for the creation of such a bank, and when the
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Lesotho Bank was established, it was intended to operate both 
as a commercial and as a development bank. In practice it has 
become primarily a commercial bank. There is thus no 
institution which specialises in the provision of development 
capital for Basotho industry. On the other hand, LNDC and BEDCO 
have provided funds for industry, the latter with funds from 
CIDA and the World Bank. The Lesotho Bank and the private 
commercial banks have provided some long-term finance, but they 
see their main job as that of supplying short and medium term 
funds. We are informed-that there ..is no shortage of short-term 
money (although particular borrowers may well find it difficult 
to obtain credit).
We do not know if there is a genuine gap in the provision of 
development finance for industry. It has been suggested that the 
main problem is the lack of 'bankable' industrial projects - but 
this may reflect the restrictive criteria employed by the 
financing institutions. The Third Plan Preview provides for the 
establishment of an industrial finance corporation. We do not 
consider that the case for such a finance corporation has been 
made out; there is no shortage of financial institutions, and an 
additional one appears superfluous. But the Lesotho Bank should 
be asked to establish a separate section - an additional 'window' - 
specialising in finance for small Industry. But if this is done, 
additional resources must be made available. First, the Bank will 
require staff experienced in this type of business. Secondly, 
loans of this type are risky. Many of the borrowers will lack 
security; the section's business will be essentially in character 
loans. Such loans imply an act of judgement concerning the 
borrower's management abilities, and credit will not be extended 
where management is thought to be inadequate. But even so, defaults 
are likely to be more frequent than with the Bank's ordinary 
operations. If government requires the Lesotho Bank to go into such 
business, it will have to ensure that funds are available on terms 
which will enable the risks to be borne. Thus the Bank will need to 
be provided with an addition to its equity capital or very soft 
loans.
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We propose that aid be sought towards enabling the Lesotho Bank 
to open a 'small industries window'. Such aid should cover 
finance on very soft terms, and any requirements in personnel 
with appropriate experience. The Bank already works closely 
with LNDC on particular projects; the establishment of a new 
section would enable such cooperation to be strengthened. It 
should also be possible for BEDCO to approach the Bank for 
finance for customers whose requirements are beyond BEDCO1s means.
There is at present virtually no local share market. We 
understand that LNDC is proposing to transfer some or all of its 
holdings in various operations to a separate investment holding 
company; shares in such a company might be sold to the public in 
the long run. At present, however, few of the enterprises are 
sufficiently profitable to attract private funds. One old 
established trading and industrial enterprise in the private sector 
has issued shares locally, but few other companies are in a 
position to do so.
We see no prospect of any rapid expansion in the local share 
market, but in the longer run the local issue of shares could both 
provide useful additional finance to the industrial sector and 
help to reduce the flow of funds to South Africa. There is, 
however, no legislation effectively controlling share issues. At 
present, this is of little importance. But it presents a danger. It
would be possible for fraudulent share issues to be made; if
sufficiently attractive, such shares could attract wide support. 
This could cause long-term damage to the prospects of building up a 
local share market. A successful share swindle would destroy 
confidence for some time 'to come.
We propose that, as a matter of urgency, the Lesotho Government 
examine its existing laws, and if necessary enact new legislation 
governing share issues. At a minimum such legislation should 
require full disclosure of the company's affairs, including past 
accounts and present financial structure, and should clarify where
in government the responsibility will lie for enforcing such
?gislation. It should be possible to obtain technical assistance
-  10 -
both for drafting legislation and for proposing machinery for 
its enforcement. This need not be elaborate; but responsibility 
must be clearly identified.
(D) Skills
We support in general the proposals in the Third Plan Preview for 
the expansion of vocational and technical education. A central 
difficulty in this field is the matching of the training which is 
offered to the jobs which are likely to be available. The Preview 
notes that many of those who receive training go to South Africa 
for work. It is not clear whether they do so because rates of pay 
in South Africa are higher or because there i« an inadequate 
demand for their specific skills in Lesotho. A clear need is 
close and continuing contact between the private sector and the 
Polytechnic in the selection and planning of courses. But 
experience would suggest that the private sector itself should be 
encouraged to play a more active part in training. The advantage 
of this approach is that skills are provided for which there is a 
known demand.
We understand that some thought has been given to the possibility 
of granting training subsidies to industry. We support this 
approach. If an industrial enterprise provides training for its 
personnel, those who have received such training may leave for 
other jobs. Thus the expenditure has been wasteful from the 
firm's point of view. But the country as a whole has gained, as 
long as the trained worker does not go abroad. We suggest that the 
present package of aids to industry should be examined with a view 
to including a system of training subsidies, if necessary at the 
expense of other forms of assistance. Such subsidies should be in 
respect of courses or other forms of training agreed with the 
relevant department, and there should be regular inspections to 
ensure that the training is in fact being provided.
I I I .  Ma rke t s
We consider separately the domestic market, the RSA market and 
other markets.
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(A) The Domestic Market
The domestic market for industrial products is virtually entirely 
occupied by South African goods. We do not have any recent 
statistics on the origins of consumption and capital goods, but 
the most casual look in the local shops will confirm this. South 
African products predominate for various reasons. They have a 
transport advantage over goods from abroad. They are protected on 
the Lesotho market. The trading organisations have strong South 
African links (even where they are not actually South African) 
and presumably have most information about South African products 
and relations with South African industries. As compared with 
Lesotho products, many South African industries enjoy economies 
of scale or economies of agglomeration. Consumers in Lesotho are 
familiar with South African products.
Little has been done to exploit the possibilities of the local 
market for Basotho products. There are several possible policy 
areas.
(a) Protection. Protection of the Lesotho market is possible under 
the Customs Union agreement, although it is limited in time and 
restricted to new industries. The purpose of protection is to 
permit the local value added in industry to be greater than is 
possible if imports are duty free (as is the case with South 
African imports under SACUA). Thus industries may be competitive 
with protection when they are uncompetitive without it. Tariff 
protection may be of two types, a duty may be levied on the 
finished product, or duties may be remitted on the materials going 
into products. Both these methods of pro-tection are possible under 
the Customs Agreement. Indeed, remission of import duties on 
materials is common in South African industry, and is readily 
obtainable for Lesotho industries.
There is little doubt that the extensive use of protection would 
enable many industries to operate which are now not viable. We are 
informed that it would be possible to administer proective duties 
or duty rebates with little difficulty. But protection involves
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costs. If duties are imposed on finished products, the costs 
fall in the first instance on the consumers. If the granting 
of tax concessions on inputs were to reduce Lesotho's revenue 
under the Customs Agreement, the cost would fall on the budget. 
The central concern of policy, then, is to determine whether 
the benefits arising from protection in terms of employment and 
incomes (both direct and indirect) outweigh the cost.
A main criterion must be whether the industry to be protected 
would survive without protection. Under SACUA, protection may be 
accorded for eight years. There is a danger that, if Government 
decides to protect an industry, a firm will be attracted which 
intends only to make quick profits and which ceases operation at 
the end of the period of protection. Thus Lesotho will have 
experienced the costs of protection for no long-term benefit.
We propose that the Lesotho Government take a more positive 
policy towards industrial protection. Industrial promotion 
literature should draw attention to the possibility of according 
protection to new industries. But at the same time a critical 
analysis should be made of any requests for protection. A useful 
guideline would be the level of effective protection requested. 
This is the proportion by which the permitted value added in the 
industry* is increased as a result of protection. If industries 
are to be protected only if it is reasonable to suppose that they 
will eventually be viable without protection, a level of 
effective protection of, say, 50% implies that local value added 
can reasonably be expected to fall by a third at the end of the 
period of protection. It is then a matter of judgement whether 
such an increase in efficiency is likely.
If a more positive protective policy is adopted, the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry will need strengthening, if necessary
Where manufacturing or processing activity is inseparable from 
the production of the raw material - i.e. the material cannot 
be used without the processing - local value added should 
include the cost of the material itself. Eut such cases will 
be rare in Lesotho.
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through Technical Cooperation, to enable it to undertake the 
necessary analytical work.
(b) Government Purchase. Government is a major market for 
industrial products. It is important that its purchasing power 
be used in such a way as to provide all reasonable assistance to 
local industry. We heard various criticisms of present procedures. 
Planning is said to be inadequate; orders may be placed so late 
that local suppliers are unable to meet them; small enterprises 
are said to be reluctant to take orders because government is 
slow in paying.
We suggest that the following procedures be adopted:
(i) New programmes or projects should be broken down into their 
components in as much detail as possible as soon as they are 
approved. Thus we understand that the new Development Plan 
is expected to include a substantial irrigation programme. 
This should be analysed into its component parts (e.g. 
pipes, tanks, pumps and so on) and the information passed
to LNDC and BEDCO. If local suppliers have sufficient 
notice they will be able to produce many of these items. If 
not, the commodities in question will inevitably be 
imported from South Africa. It should be a general rule that 
such an analysis of all projects be made and communicated at 
the earliest possible date.
(ii) Purchasing departments should examine the specifications for 
their requirements so as to ensure that the standards 
required are not such as to exclude local suppliers. 
Frequently standards for government purchases are specified 
in particular ways, not because such standards are necessary 
to meet the requirements of the users, but because those 
making the specifications are accustomed to particular 
products. The criterion should be need rather than tradition.
(iii) The Government stores officer should adapt his purchasing
policy to the problems of small Basotho suppliers. Thus
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Government should be ready to hold stocks of standard 
items so as to allow for a steady flow of orders to local 
producers. If necessary, tenders should be broken up into 
small parcels so as to permit small producers to bid for 
them.
(iv) Just as there is a case for a measure of protection in
the private market for industrial products, so government 
should be ready to accord a reasonable preference to local 
suppliers in its own purchasing policy. We understand that 
some preference may be accorded, although we were not able 
to obtain accurate information on how this operated. Many 
small producers are unable to compete with imports without 
some preference. The main justification for such 
preferences is that, by producing for the public sector 
market, small industrialists gain experience and eventually 
become more competitive. The main disadvantage of a fixed 
margin of preference for local producers is that it 
provides a lower level of effective protection for 
producers whose value added is high than for those whose 
value added is low. An industry whose local value added is 
50% of the value of the product will receive half the level 
of effective protection accorded by a particular 
preferential margin as compared with that received by an 
industry whose local value added is only 25% of the value 
of the product. Thus the greater the relative contribution 
of an industry to the economy, the lower its potential 
benefit from a fixed preferential margin. Even if a minimum 
proportion of local value added is specified, such 
discrepancies will remain.
We have no simple answer to this difficulty. One possibility 
is that the preference should be related to the cost of 
local labour and materials incorporated in the product. But 
this may be administratively difficult, and impose a heavy 
burden on government and producers. Alternatively, the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry could draw up a list of 
local products in collaboration with LNDC and BEDCO and make
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approximate estimates of the proportion of value added. 
Preferences would then be specified for particular groups 
of commodities (e.g. clothing, furniture) aiming at a 
level of effective protection of, say, 25%. Once such a 
list had been drawn up, its administration should be 
simple. We suggest that, if the technical staff of the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry is strengthened in the 
way we suggest above, the personnel concerned should 
coordinate an exercise along these lines.
(c) Purchase by Other Sectors. Until recently virtually all the 
industrial products used in other sectors (e.g. agriculture, 
tourism, construction) were imported. This is now beginning to 
change. Some of the requirements for the new Hilton Hotel (light 
fittings, furniture) have been produced locally. Concrete blocks 
and some joinery items are now made in Lesotho. But inter­
industry linkages generally are still very weak.
It would not be practicable to compel local enterprises to buy 
local products; indeed, since many local products are more 
expensive than imports, to do so would make it more difficult for 
Lesotho enterprise to survive. But as much as possible should be 
done to encourage local purchase. One difficulty is that of 
information. There is no comprehensive, recent list of 
manufacturing and processing industries. We suggest that the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry publish a commercial and 
industrial yearbook. This would include general production and 
trade statistics, information of use to industry, and a list of 
manufacturing enterprises, including information on their products. 
Such a publication would at least provide the basis for inter­
industry linkages. Although Lesotho is a small country, it is 
probable that many local products are not known by potential local 
consumers. If the list were comprehensive, it could be of 
particular assistance to small suppliers, who have most difficulty 
in publicising their products.
(B) The South African Market
Lesotho industry has had little success in the South African 
market, in spite of the free entry provided under SACUA. There are
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various reasons for this. As we have suggested above, many 
Lesotho products are not competitive with South African products. 
In spite of years of negotiation, there are still restrictions on 
the use of the most appropriate transport modes inside South 
Africa. Many of the Lesotho manufacturers have little knowledge 
of marketing. There are widely believed to be important non-tariff 
barriers in the South African market; in many industries, markets 
are shared by a few oligopolistic producers and it is virtually 
impossible for other products to obtain an entry.
Both LNDC and BEDCO provide assistance in marketing, and the 
relaxation of transport restrictions is likely to be a slow 
process. But more could be done to combat non-tariff barriers in 
the South African market. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
should ask any manufacturer who faces such barriers to provide 
relevant Information. Such cases should then be raised at the 
periodical meetings of the Customs Union Commission. The South 
African government may well claim that these barriers are not in 
formal breach of SACUA; but they are clearly against the spirit of 
the Agreement. Such a policy would suggest that the Ministry 
maintained far closer contact with existing manufacturers than now 
appears to be the case. We return to this point later.
(C) Other External Markets
Lesotho, like many other African developing countries, has 
favourable access to the EEC market under the Second ACP-EEC 
Convention of 1979. It is among the countries to be accorded 
'special treatment and special measures' (see Article 155 of the 
Agreement). We lack recent data on the direction of Lesotho 
exports, but it appears that very little use has been made so far 
of the special access to the European market provided by the Lome 
agreements. This reflects the general weakness of the industrial 
sector in Lesotho. But there are specific problems arising from 
Lesotho's landlocked position and dependence on South African 
transport.
We understand that proposals are now under consideration for the 
containerisation of Lesotho's trade through South Africa. If this
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reduces the cost of transport and lowers the time taken for 
products to reach overseas markets, it should be of some 
assistance to industrial exports. In the longer run, the 
completion of the new airport should facilitate the export of 
comparatively high value/low weight manufactures both to Africa 
and Europe. Some planning may be necessary, however, to take 
the fullest advantage of either containerisation or air 
transport. We have not examined existing export arrangements, 
but we suggest that, if containerisation goes ahead, the 
institutions concerned,’* (The Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 
the Central Planning and Development Office, LNDC and BEDCO) 
should jointly examine the requirements of the Industrial sector 
for the most effective use of the system. If existing arrangements 
are inadequate, the Lesotho Government or LNDC should consider 
establishing a joint venture with a company with experience in the 
organisation of exports and Imports. The Commonwealth Secretariat 
might be able to provide information on the experience of other African 
countries in this area.
IV. A d m in i s t r a t iv e  Q u e s t io n s
Several of those with whom we discussed industrial issues drew 
attention to administrative weaknesses in the formulation and 
implementation of industrial policy. The main points at issue are 
as follows:
(a) It is not clear where the main responsibility for industrial 
policy lies. Four institutions are involved - the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry, LNDC, BEDCO and the Central Planning and 
Development Office. Industrial policy should in principle be 
coordinated by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. But the 
Ministry lacks the necessary technical staff to do this effectively.
As a result, many issues (e.g. protection, industrial finance, 
government purchase policy) obtain insufficient consideration, 
since they are not clearly within the field of responsibility of any 
of the other institutions.
Cb) T h is  gap i s  compounded by  the f a c t  th a t  one of the main func t ions  of the M i n i s t r y  
a p p e a r s  to u s  e i t h e r  u s e l e s s  o r  d a m a g in g .T h i s  is the l i c e n s in g  of i n d u s t r y .  We
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appreciate that Government will wish to be informed about the 
establishment of new industries, and that there is therefore a 
need for some system of registration. But existing arrangements 
add an extra weight to the difficulties of starting industries 
at all in Lesotho. Moreover, the criteria on which licences are 
granted or refused are far from clear; indeed it was suggested 
to us that the outcome of an application would depend partly on 
how the Industrial Licensing Board felt at the time. Lastly, 
licensing systems benefit plausible rogues, ’who know how to put 
a project together in a convincing way, but whose activities turn 
out to be of little benefit to anybody but themselves.
(c) Once an industrial enterprise has been established,
Government appears to lose all interest in its welfare (unless it 
is under the wing of LNDC or BEDCO) . T h i s  l a c k  of c lo s e  c o n t a c t  between 
Government and industry means that the Ministry may be unaware 
both of the problems facing the manufacturing sector and of the 
opportunities which existing enterprises may have for expansion 
or diversification. Thus, while much effort is expended in 
attracting or encouraging new industrial enterprises, virtually 
nothing is done to encourage and assist existing enterprise. Yet, 
in terms of cost-effectiveness, it may not unreasonably be 
supposed that resources are more economically used in encouraging 
an existing enterprise to grow than in assisting the establishment 
of a new enterprise.
(d) Data on industries are out of date. The latest edition of the 
Census of Industrial Production has data only up to 1975/76. This 
delay reflects staffing problems in the Bureau of Statistics.
We suggest that the government takes the following measures to 
strengthen the administration of industrial policy.
(i) The expertise available to the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry should be strengthened. We suggest elsewhere 
additional work in a number of areas. In addition to the 
present Industrial Planning Advisor, an industrial economist
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with experience In small, peripheral countries, should be 
recruited for the Ministry, if necessary through Technical > 
Cooperation.
(11) The Industrial Licensing Act should be amended so as to 
provide for the automatic granting of licences against 
payment. Licences should be renewable annually, and it 
should be a condition of renewal that basic information on 
the operations of the enterprise, (employment, wage-bill, 
products, output and value added) should be provided.
(iii) We have already suggested the preparation of a Commerce and 
Industry Yearbook. A licensing system on these lines should 
produce the necessary data.
(iv) The Ministry should maintain close contact with existing 
industries. One possibility is the creation of an industrial 
extension service. Such a service would, however, be 
difficult to staff at all adequately. If its personnel were 
inadequate, it would be,at best useless, and possibly harmful. 
But whether an industrial extension service is created or 
not, officers of the Ministry should consider it as part of 
their normal duties to keep in regular touch with industries, 
become aware of their problems, and take needed action when 
difficulties arise. Thus, if an enterprise wishes to expand 
but cannot obtain the necessary land, the Ministry should see 
its role - at least partly - as acting as an intermediary 
between the industrial sector and those branches of 
government whose policies affect the actual or potential 
manufacturer.
Conclusions
The development of industry in Lesotho is likely to be neither 
r a p i d  nor easy. But we believe that changes in policy and planning 
procedures could materially improve the prospects for local 
industry. There is no shortage of public sector institutions 
concerned with the promotion of industry. The central issue is to
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identify those changes in policy or procedures which would 
enable them to operate more effectively. In some cases this 
will involve additional resources in finance and manpower.
Such resources should be sought under aid programmes. But
there must also be a readiness on the part of Government to
recognise both the importance of this sector and the need to
take a broad view of the possibilities of industrial policy. t
&
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ANNEX A
T E R M S  OF R E F E R E N C E  FOR A STUDY ON THE D E P E N D E N C E  OF THE
B . L . S .  ECONOMIES ON THE R E P U F L IC  OF SOUTH AFRICA____________
( F o r  the  In te r im  and F in a l  R ep o r t )
The G ove rnm en ts  of B o tsw an a ,  L e so tho  and S w a z i l a n d  ( the P . L . S .  
c o u n t r i e s )  have r e v ie w e d  t h e i r  economic s i tua t ion  w ith in  the  con tex t  of the 
S o u th e r n  A fr ican  r e g io n  and have r e s o l v e d  jo in t ly  to com m iss ion  an  immediate 
s tudy  w hich  w il l  seek  to quant i fy  t h e i r  economic  dependence  on the  Republ ic  
of S ou th  A f r i ca  and recom m end  pos i t ive  m e a s u r e s  to a s s i s t  t h e i r  economic  
development in  the l ight of c h an g e s  o c c u r r i n g  in the r e g io n .
2. A c co rd ing ly ,  the  t h r e e  G overnm en ts  have  d e te rm in ed  upon the  following 
t e r m s  of r e f e r e n c e  fo r  the  s tudy
( i )  To iden t i fy ,  de f ine  and quan t i fy  the  ex ten t  of dependence  
of the P . L . S .  econom ies  on the  Republ ic  of S ou th  A f r i ca ,  
with s p e c ia l  r e f e r e n c e  to  in t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  t r a d e ,  
e n e r g y ,  food and o th e r  e s s e n t i a l  su p p l i e s ,  employment,  
communica t ions  and s e r v i c e s  ( s u c h  a s  c o n s t ru c t io n ,  main­
te n a n c e ,  d i s t r ib u t io n  and f ina nc e )  and w h e r e  p o s s ib l e ,  
m e a s u r e s  th a t  would p r o g r e s s i v e l y  r e d u c e  the  dep e n ­
dence  of the  P . L . S .  econom ies  on the  Republ ic  of Sou th  
A f r i c a .
( i i )  To iden t i fy  m e a s u r e s  to  c o u n t e r  a d v e r s e  f a c t o r s  which  
c u r r e n t l y  impede  i n d u s t r i a l  development and inves tm en t  
in  the P . L . S .  c o u n t r i e s  and c o n t r ib u te  p o s i t i v e ly  to 
a c c e l e r a t e d  i n d u s t r i a l  development and inves tm en t  in 
the  P . L . S .  c o u n t r i e s .
( i i i )  To iden t i fy  m e a s u r e s  of a p r e p a r a t o r y  and con t ingency
plann ing  n a t u r e ,  to  be ta k e n  by the  B . L . S .  G overnm en ts ,  
th a t  would s t r e n g th e n  the ab i l i ty  of the  econom ies  of the  
P . L . S .  c o u n t r i e s  to w i th s tand  the e f fe c t s  of in t e rn a t io n a l  
sa n c t io n s  a g a in s t  the Republ ic  of Sou th  A f r i ca  and of 
w h a te v e r  r e t a l i a t o r y  m e a s u r e s  the  Government  of the 
Republic  of S ou th  A f r ica  might in t ro d u c e  with  p a r t i c u l a r  
r e f e r e n c e  t o : -
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( a )  The S o u t h e r n  A fr ica  Cus toms Union a r r a n g e m e n t s ;
(1>) F i s c a l  and M o n e ta ry  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  ;
( c )  The  a va i lab i l i ty  of oil  and o th e r  e s s e n t i a l  su p p l i e s ,  and
(d)  The m ul t ip l i e r  e f fect  on the  B . L . S .  econom ies  of a 
l ike ly  r e s u l t a n t  r e c e s s i o n  in the Republ ic  of S ou th
A f r i c a .  >
♦
( iv )  To examine the  po ten t ia l  im p l ica t ions  on the  P . L . S .  economies  ^
of the r e c e n t  S o u th  A f r ica n  l e g i s l a t io n  th a t  e m p o w ers  the 
M in i s t e r  of Economic  A f fa i r s  to have comple te  c o n t r o l  o v e r  
i n d u s t r i a l  p ro d u c t io n ,  w i th  p a r t i c u l a r  r e f e r e n c e  to th o se  
p r o d u c t s  tha t  a r e  of  im por ta nc e  to the  B . L . S .  econ om ies .
3 .  The  Governments of the  F . L . S .  c o u n t r i e s  c o n s i d e r  such  a s tudy  to be
of the  u tm os t  im por tance  and u r g e n c y  and w ish ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  to be in p o s s e s s i o n  
of the r e p o r t  of the  s tudy a s  soon a s  p o s s ib l e .
4 ,  10 c o p ie s  of an in te r im  r e p o r t  and 20 c o p ie s  of a f inal r e p o r t  s h a l l  be
submitted  s im u l ta ne ous ly  to each  of the following ;
The  S e c r e t a r y  fo r  E x t e r n a l  A ffa i r s
P r i v a t e  F a g  1
GABORONE
B otsw ana
The  P e r m a n e n t  S e c r e t a r y  
M in i s t r y  of F in a n c e  
P . O .  Box MS630 
MASERU 
L eso tho
The P e r m a n e n t  S e c r e t a r y
M in i s t r y  of In d u s t ry ,  Mines  and  T o u r i sm
P . O .  Box 451
MBABANE
S w a z i l a n d
- 
*
SECRET
REDUCING 
DEPENDENCE
(Final Reports to the Governments of 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland)
Report
on
Swaziland
Commissioned from the Institute of Development Studies 
at the University of Sussex
Prepared by Reginald H. Green 
Michael Lipton 
Percy Selwyn
Commonwealth Secretariat
June 1980
PR E l - ACE
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Lesotho and Swaziland was commissioned from the Institute of 
Development Studies by the Commonwealth Secretariat in response to 
a joint request from the Governments of these countries.
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with the Interim Report since it provides supplementary material and, 
in some cases, further elaborations of conclusions and recommendations 
included in the Interim Report. The Interim Reports of the three 
countries also contain a general section which deals with issues of 
regional concern or of joint concern to the three countries. The 
general section is not being repeated in this Final Report. The 
content of this Final Report reflects the interests expressed by the 
Government of Swaziland in its reactions to the Interim Report.
The Secretariat is indebted to the authors for agreeing to 
undertake this study and for their dedicated service and co-operative 
attitude in completing this very worthwhile task. It also acknowledges 
the assistance provided by Professor H.M.A. C>nitiri, who acted as 
a consultant to the Secretariat on the project. The views expressed 
in this Repoi't are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the Commonwealth Secretariat.
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Introduction - Critical Areas of Dependence
CHAPTER 1
The Interim Report, to the Governments of Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland, Reducing Dependence, prepared by Professors  
I?. II. Green and M. Lipton and Mr. P .  Selwyn of the Institute of 
Development Studies, Brighton, England, was submitted to these 
Governments by the Commonwealth Secretariat in January 1979. 
Each Government received ten copies of the Interim Report, dealing 
with issues affecting all three countries, and of a detailed Annex 
specific to its own country. The terms of reference for the work, 
both on the Interim Report and subsequently, are set out as Annex A 
to this Final Report.
In view of comments and suggestions from the three Governments, it 
was decided that the most useful procedure was to prepare the three 
Final Reports (dealing separately with the topics raised by each 
country) instead of a further general report on all three countries.
How Can One Tackle Dependence?
We believe the first step toward tackling the challenge of reducing 
Swaziland's economic dependence in the Republic of South Africa is 
to consider each of the main areas of dependence with a view to 
identifiying what is needed to alter the existing position. This is 
a relatively straightforward exercise. It cannot, by itself, 
provide answers in the form of projects, policies or programmes 
but it can provide guidelines within which to fit and against which 
to test policies, programmes and projects.
The critical areas of dependence are employment, government revenue, 
foreign exchange (including external finance), food, power, water, 
transport and communication and import sources.
Employment in the RSA is of the order of 20,000 or about a fifth 
of total wage and salary employment of Swaziland citizens. South 
Africa is restricting Swaziland employment - both the attempt to 
make Bantustans less unviabie and unattractive and the internal 
reforms in respect 'to labour conditions and to urban Africans 
launched by Prime Minister Botha point in the direction of rapid 
future cutbacks on mines recruitment in Swaziland. Certainly, at 
best, no contribution to meeting the additional employment needs of 
Swaziland can be expected from the Republic labour market. A more 
prudent assumption is a reduction of Swazi employment in RSA to - 
say - 5,000 before 1985. Therefore, more opportunity for earning a 
decent income - whether in employment or self employment which does
afford a cash income of at least E.500 a year are needed to reduce 
dependence and to meet the basic need of providing adequate productive 
employment and self employment.
Government: Revenue is dominated by SACUA payments. With the 
exception of years marked by very high sugar prices leading to 
exceptional Sugar Levy and Company Tax revenues, SACUA payments 
amount to about 507, of Recurrent Revenue and the share appears to 
be on a rising trend. The question of eventual disengagement 
from SACUA is a complicated one. On a cash flow basis the 
"net" revenue gains from the 427. uplift are to a considerable 
extent offset by the lagged payment formula so long as inflation 
and/or quantity increases cause rapid growth in Swaziland’s 
imports. However, the broader question of 507, dependence on 
import duties (the domestic excise component is very small) also 
confronts Swaziland. That dependence will remain until a 
broader export and company tax base can be created and/or local 
manufacturing provides a possible output base for a (manufacturer/ 
importer level) sales tax and a significantly large taxable personal 
income flow.
Foreign exchange (including external finance) is not at first 
glance an area of dependence on- the Republic of South Africa.
Only about 10% of exports are to the Republic. However, by 1978 
Swaziland’s traditional positive balance of trade had turned into 
a deficit of nearly E.100 million (607, of total export value).
1979 is likely to have shown at least as unfavourable an outturn. 
Therefore Swaziland is becoming heavily dependent on external 
sources of finance. With the exception of official aid the bulk 
of these are RSA sources.
Increasing exports are essential to halt the growing dependence on 
external finance. To do that will require much more than the 
two coal mines now in prospect - at best they provide a breathing 
space. New natural resource based industries are essential to 
sustain Swaziland’s past record of sustained growth and to avert 
a position of permanent, severe external trade imbalance which 
would be likely to lead to sharply increased financial dependence 
on the Republic.
Food is a major component of imports. Swaziland - despite 
a predominantly rural and agricultural population - is self- 
sufficient in few foodstuffs beyond its leading export, sugar.
Grain, fruit and vegetables, tinned goods, meat and dairy products, 
cooking oil- in each case imports are a substantial portion of 
total and especially of total urban consumption. The dominant - 
indeed almost exclusive - source of supply is the Republic; a 
logical situation if the need to import is taken as given.
The need to  in c re a s e  dom estic food production  and, in p a r t i c u l a r ,  
to  achieve s u b s ta n t ia l  r u r a l  commercial production d ir e c te d  to  
Sw aziland's urban markets i s  e v id en t. However, th e  requirem ents  
a re  complex. Food crop a g r i c u l tu r e  o r ie n te d  to  s a le s  must o f f e r  an 
a c ce p ta b le  le v e l  of cash income or farm ers w i l l  not engage in  i t .
The r i s e  in c o tto n  production dem onstrates th a t  crops seen as pro­
viding adequate rewards are  grown. The reasons fo r  inadequate income 
d ou btless  include a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r a c t i c e s ,  knowledge and land tenure  
but are  not lim ited  to  them. Marketing is  u su ally  poor (eg v eg e ta b les  
or b eliev ed  by farm ers to  be in e q u ita b le  (eg m aiz e ) .  More g e n e r a l ly ,  
the u n c e r ta in ty  of r a i n f a l l  means th a t  in much of Swaziland th e re  is  
a s tro n g  ca se  fo r  p ro v isio n  of i r r i g a t i o n  (major scheme, minor 
scheme or b o r e h o le ) . Water use planning and implementation (and
subsequent water allocation) are central to future agricultural 
output trends and patterns and, therefore, to reduction of food 
dependency.
Power is increasingly imported from the Republic. Within a few 
years up to 75% of the SEB's power will be purchased from ESCOM 
if present trends continue. The power comes by one, soon 
two, transmission lines which are potentially highly vulnerable to 
interruptions of service. Further, moving from the earlier 
position of self-sufficiency to basic import dependence signifi­
cantly worsens the external balance position.
The way to reduce dependence is self-evidently by domestic 
generation. The problem with coal-fired stations - at least in 
the next decade - is that SEB has no experience with them and, 
more serious, that economies of scale make ESCOM's (coal powered) 
supply significantly less expensive. A coal-based power
self-sufficiency programme would entail severe rate increases.
In respect to hydroelectric power the problems have been perceived 
differently. The project now under way will not entail major cost 
increases but will at best meet the increase in demand for a few 
years and not reduce absolute import levels. Beyond that project, 
future possibilities - seen from a purely SEB point of view - 
pose increasing problems of dependability, unit cost, or both.
Water is an area of dependency which is rarely cited as such. 
However, it is the most immediately and perhaps ultimately the most 
serio u s  one. A very substantial portion of Swaziland's water 
supply flows into the Kingdom from the Republic. In the absence 
of international water rights agreements, these flows are now 
totally at risk. South Africa's own water resource projections 
show severe shortages in the face of rapidly increasing demand,
particularly in areas of the Rand which can, and will, be served 
by drawing on the headwaters of rivers flowing into Swaziland.
While a binding rivaruse agreement with South Africa is essential 
to limit the loss of water, there is no chance that it will leave 
the Kingdom with adequate assured water supplies. That requires 
much better knowledge, leading to effective capturing and 
allocation,' both of the water crossing the border and of that 
generated by rainfall on Swaziland watersheds.
River-basin water resource planning is critical in respect both to 
agriculture and to power. To date hydro and irrigation uses
of water have not been considered jointly. Finding cost-efficient 
solutions to reduced external dependence - in respect to power, food, 
and.including agricultural production for agro-industry, 
and/or direct export -requires a coordinated national water resource 
policy implemented through multi-purpose projects. Water is 
likely to prove to be the scarcest and most constraining resource 
in Swaziland; therefore its safeguarding, development and allo­
cation is of central importance.
Transport and communications dependence is pervasive. Tele­
communications are through the Republic. The same is true of long­
distance international air services. Swaziland Railways are 
significantly dependent on South African Railways in respect to 
senior personnel, training, maintenance of heavy equipment and 
rolling stocks. Lorry operations are dominated by subsidiaries of 
South African firms.
Little of this dependence is inevitable and much is uneconomic 
even in the short term. A Class B ground satellite station would 
end telecommunications dependence and be profitable. Extending 
Matsapha Airport to 737 standard (as now planned) would allow
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medium distance passenger, mail and cargo service (e.g. from 
Nairobi and Kinshasa as well as Lusaka and Salisbury). Swaziland 
Railways can continue - and probably should accelerate - its 
training, rehabilitation, maintenance facility, marshalling yard 
and rolling stock procurement programmes to become a genuinely 
self-managed and serviced entity. Development of both small and 
large-scale local road haulage is possible if business can be 
assured and potential customers reassured.
Import sources are dominantly South African. Indeed given the 
limited development both of manufacturing and of commercial 
production of food, it is accurate to say that goods sources in 
general are dominantly South African. This situation limits 
growth of domestic employment and production as well as limiting 
freedom of manoeuvre and, in some cases, raising costs in respect 
to external trade. It also creates special problems in respect 
to any loosening of SACU links. To lose the SACU revenues while 
still buying from South African sources - whether least-cost or 
not - and at South African domestic wholesale prices - whether these 
were typical of RSA export prices or not - would be to achieve the 
worst of all possible worlds. There would be foreign exchange 
losses in respect to SACU and no gain§ on import costs. Further, 
under these circumstances to preserve revenue would require major 
(perhaps 20 - 25%) average increases in user prices.
The two ways of reducing supply dependence are evidently increasing 
and diversifying Swaziland production and diversifying sources of 
imports. The former is evidently a complex question but certain 
areas - e.g. food, construction, power - stand out. So do certain
instruments including government purchasing policy. Diversification
of imports is primarily an institutional problem. Existing
importers are largely South African based or tied and cannot be 
expected either to diversify on their own or, beyond a very 
limited extent, to respond positively to state pressures.
Therefore, some new import house (or houses) able to procure 
effectively on a global basis is needed.
In respect to each of the areas cited there is a strong case for 
dependence reduction in order to achieve Swaziland development.
This is true in terms of growth potential for domestic production 
and employment as well as of room for manoeuvre in formulating 
Swaziland’s economic policies. That case is quite independent 
both of the nature of the South African regime and of the 
possibility of sanctions against, or problems within,the Republic.
The latter points affect, not dependence reduction as such, but 
priority,time scales, and degrees. The nature of the regime makes 
dependence on the Republic particularly unwelcome and constraining 
to Swaziland. Further, it means that unchanged dependency 
relations with South Africa may have increasing costs in terms of 
relations with other states in the region and with external aid 
donors and investors.
The possibility of sanctions against or of internal disturbances 
in the Republic creates particular urgency in respect to transport 
and communications, power, employment and sources of supply dependence 
and to SACU questions. Whatever the most desirable course, degree 
and pace of dependence reduction may be in the abstract, Swaziland 
needs to achieve a position in which selective sanctions against 
the Republic (or internal events in it), leading to loss of jobs, 
power and goods (particularly but not solely petroleum and
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food),do not create intolerable conditions in Swaziland. 
Contingency planning and standby measures are part of the answer, 
but only a part. Airports and power stations cannot be built 
nor alternative commercial channels and firms created overnight. 
Even in cases in which standby arrangements are practicable 
they are likely to need to be backed by interim stocks, e.g. of 
petroleum products and foods or facilities designed primarily 
for contingency use, e.g. a link to a power grid other than 
ESCOM* s.
CHAPTER II
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What Action Programmes Are Needed?
This chapter and the two succeeding ones do not purport to be a 
complete list of programmes, still less of projects for reducing 
dependence. In the first place, we have neither the expertise 
nor the detailed knowledge of Swaziland to attempt such an 
exercise which would, in effect, constitute the bulk of a 
twenty year perspective plan for Swaziland. Secondly, the 
Swaziland government requested us to concentrate on a limited 
number of areas.
In respect to these we have sought to identify programmes relevant 
to reducing the main elements of dependence outlined in the first 
chapter. Where possible we have also sought to identify 
programme and policy instruments - including those now under active 
consideration or preliminary implementation which we feel could 
be effective in promoting the positive aspects of dependence 
reduction identified in Chapter I.
The areas covered are:
a. seeking foreign support;
b. water reservoirs;
c. transport and communication;
d. industrial development;
e. customs union;
f. sources of goods.
The first four are covered in this chapter, the fifth in Chapter 
III and the last in Chapter IV. This arrangement is not 
intended to imply that the last two are substantially
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more important than the others - indeed it is arguable that 
water resource development is the most critical. Rather it 
flows from the fact that particular questions posed to us required 
in the Customs Union case a detailed analysis and in the sources 
of goods case a coherent set of proposals of full chapter length.
~In the other cases such lengthy presentations appeared 
unnecessary, especially because in some - e.g. transport and 
. communications, water resources development, a substantial body of 
materials and proposals exists.
This section of the report is meant to be read together with the 
Interim Report. Where we have no new comments or suggestions as 
to a sector or a project, we have in general not repeated the 
interim report’s analysis and suggestions.
Foreign Support
Assisting Southern African states to reduce dependence on the 
Republic of South Africa is a stated - and to varying degrees an 
operational - goal of most major sources of official development 
assistance. However, to capitalise on this goal as a means to 
securing finance requires rather more than Swaziland's assertion 
or belief that a project or programme reduces dependence.
*
* Demonstration is needed that:
. 1. the project or programme would be an integral part of a pattern
of development increasing Swaziland’s economic viability and 
economic options by reducing one or more of the dependencies 
cited in the previous chapter; and/or
is critical to contingency planning to enable Swaziland to avoid 
major disruptions or massive costs in the event of external 
sanctions against or internal disturbances in the Republic.
In some cases one or both are easy to demonstrate. A hydro­
electric (or a coal fired thermal) power station falls in both 
categories, as does a Class B earth satellite station.
In other cases more care is needed to make the connection. A 
national water resource development plan implemented through 
multi-purpose projects is critical to employment, food and foreign 
exchange dependence reduction. However, that is not self evident 
to the avid agency reader and must be argued convincingly. Similarly 
an import sector joint venture at first glance has little to do 
with medium term dependence reduction and less with contingency 
planning. In fact it relates to both. Without a new import 
house not oriented to RSA sources, import concentration on the 
Republic will not fall and withdrawal from SACU will never become 
a viable option. Further, without such an enterprise in being 
the costs - in money and in shortages - of forced withrawal from 
SACU and forced alteration of import sources consequential on 
sanctions/disturbances could be crippling (see Chapter IV).
Apparently some projects critical to reducing dependence and to 
increasing options have been rejected by some prospective donors or. the 
grounds that they fall outside "basic needs". This - if a genuine 
reason for opposition or rejection - can and should be refuted.
The formal international definition of basic needs centres on 
expanded employment and self employment at levels of productivity 
adequate to allow households to meet basic personal consumption 
needs (e.g. food, clothing, shelter) and the state to provide basic 
communal consumption (e.g. education, health, water, transport, 
infrastructure). The World Employment Conference Report which 
is the most internationally authoritative definition is quite •
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inconsistent with any interpretation limiting basic needs to 
government services such as health and education.
Almost every programme and project within a dependence reduction 
strategy does relate to several basic needs - notably employment, 
rural incomes and food in respect to water resource planning,
■* development and allocation. Certain contingency oriented projects 
may not at first glance relate closely to basic needs. However, 
since their purpose is to avoid Swaziland being put in a position 
where it could not meet basic needs as a result of events 
external to itself,the lack of direct relevance is much more 
apparent than real. For example, extending Matsapha Airport may 
be a marginal project in terms of short-run contribution to top 
priority goals. However, in the event of sanctions against or 
serious internal disturbances in the Republic,it would be vital to 
providing fast, direct access for passengers, mail and freight to 
the outside world. This would be particularly critical in the 
first months after any such contingency before new sources and 
routes could be established on a more permanent basis.
Both the dependence reduction and basic needs goal on the part of 
aid agencies and of Swaziland create a special opportunity and 
* problem. This is securing some proportion of "soft" funding for 
' directly productive projects. For example, it is likely that some 
multiple purpose river basin water development projects will have 
discounted rates of return of 10-12%. Those are not adequate rates 
to  render it safe to use totally commercial finance at 18-20%, even 
when account is taken of probable inflation erosion of the true cost 
of debt service. If however, both dependence reduction and employment, 
rural incomes, agro-industry, food and export development require 
massive, co-ordinated water development, then the answer is not to
reject the projects as unviable but to secure a substantial proportion 
of the finance on grant or concessional loan terms.
Ironically, a particular set of problems arise in relations with aid 
agencies precisely because of existing patterns of dependence. These 
relate to the agencies' great reluctance with regard to procurement from 
South Africa and construction contracts awarded to South African firms
- even in circumstances where the Swazi Government feels that other
sources would involve intolerable costs or delays.
Potentially these conflicts can be used as ways to educate the
agencies to the importance of increasing Swaziland's self-reliance 
and options. In the case of construction a number of possibilities 
arise: e.g. accepting the extra costs of using Swaziland 
construction firms/ supporting the establishment of a joint 
venture between a European construction firm and a Swaziland 
public sector entity; providing technical assistance to identify 
possibilities for and build up domestic production of construction 
inputs/ and/or support for expanded technical and vocational 
education. Certain actions by Swaziland in respect to government 
purchases and development of a new import enterprise oriented to 
non-RSA sources, discussed in Chapter IV below, might also make a 
contribution to removing some of these obstacles to harmonious 
relations with aid agencies by reducing the share of RSA goods in 
procurement for projects.
Water and Power
Water is critical to Swaziland's development. It is equally closely 
linked with dependence and its reduction.
The first problem is that Swaziland's present flow of 1,125 cusecs
from South Africa would - on present South African plans - be 
reduced to 337 cusecs by 1990. The loss would be particularly 
severe in the Komati Greater Usutu, Nguampiji and Assegani flows.
This unsatisfactory situation is compounded by Swaziland's moral 
and practical obligations to permit some level of flows into 
Mozambique from the Ngwavuma and Usutu basins.
There are no established user rights agreements among South 
Africa, Mozambique and Swaziland. Negotiations have been held 
sporadically since 1966 with no results. Meanwhile South Africa 
has begun to divert water and will continue to do so. Swaziland 
has been hampered by lack of data and of bargaining leverage. The 
1979 and 1980 technical work by the US Army Corps of Engineers 
should have helped remedy the first weakness for the critical 1980 
negotiations. However, prospects for retaining adequate flows - 
especially in the Komati valley-are not good. In that case an 
"established practice" case (which has some international legal 
foundation) can be made in negotiations with RSA. Given the priority 
RSA sets on projects such as the SASOLS to which it intends to divert 
■the water, the results are uncertain.
In the past water development has not been approached systematically. 
This is now urgent. Available water - if the RSA flows are reduced - 
is of the order of 2,677 cusecs. Present use (including the Mbulozi 
irrigation scheme) is of the order of 1,800 cusecs. To bring 100,000 
additional acres known to be suitable under irrigation would raise 
the total requirement to 3,400 cusecs which is above total availability 
;_te apart from growth in urban ana industrial demand.
nee agricultural development - especially in the low veld - and 
mestic power supply are both dependent on availability of water,
the prospects are alarming. They indicate that co-ordinated action 
is required to assess, to augment (eg by storage), to harness and 
to allocate water resources to priority uses and to cut waste (eg 
oyeruse in irrigation) to a minimum. Then and only then can Swazi­
land continue rural and urban development despite RSA reduction of 
■water flows.
Data Collection and Analysis
The preliminary USACE study suggests that careful study of 
availabilities, ways of augmenting them and multi purpose approaches 
to river basin development could yield significant gains. Their 
draft terms of reference for a 50 year study appear sound. We 
advise that commissioning and completing that study is a matter of 
priority and of urgency.
Given the shortage of water, combined irrigation/power development- 
not separate projects for each-seem to be indicated. Otherwise 
optimal storage and release patterns cannot be achieved and much 
of the potential value of the water to agriculture and/or power 
generation will be lost.
Multi purpose projects are expensive and have long gestation 
periods. A tentative conceptual study of such a project for the 
Little Usutu basin suggests a total cost (discounted at 10%) of 
about E 130 million includingyOr E 110 million excluding, interest. 
Direct monetary benefits on the same basis total about E 140 million 
of which E 130 million arise from irrigation (120) and power (10).
These estimations - in the absence of data from the proposed water 
resources and uses study - are necessarily highly tentative. They 
suggest four things:
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1. multi purpose projects are likely to be viable at least for some 
basins (especially if any allowance is made for social benefits);
2. the margin of viability is not very wide so that projects are 
highly sensitive to interest rates and major cost overruns;
3. viability would be greatly increased if a substantial 
proportion of the capital required could be secured on a grant 
or soft loan basis with an extended grace period but would be 
destroyed by borrowing the bulk of the funds on 15-18% 5 to 7 
year Eurodollar loans;
4. total costs (excluding interest) for a 10-15 year multipurpose 
water development programme are likely to be of the order of
E 500 million (about E 1,000 per citizen of Swaziland).
These factors strongly suggest that as soon as adequate data from 
the study are to hand,at least one multipurpose river basin water 
development feasibility study should be commissioned and completed 
as a matter of urgency. If possible, discussions with potential 
co-ooerating aid agencies should be begun as soon as preliminary 
feasibility study results are to hand. Involvement of USAID, EEC, 
and the Federal Republic of Germany might be particularly useful, 
as their commitment to water development in Swaziland would - via 
their governments - increase Swaziland's leverage with RSA in water 
flownegotiations.
The sense of urgency flows from the fact that such projects have a 
long gestation period at the best of times. If the overall survey 
is completed by the end of 1980 and the feasibility study by late 
1981 then mid-1982 would be the earliest date by which finance could
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have been arranged. Mid-1983 would then appear to be an optimistic 
estimate of the actual start of construction and 1986 for the 
project providing irrigation water power. With such long built in 
lags, it is critical to avoid furthering extending the time frame 
by gaps between stages.
Allocation of water raises issues beyond the scope of this report. 
However, if employment, food and rural income aspects of 
dependence reduction are seen as critical, allocating all or most 
of the water to a series of large estates is not likely to be 
optimal. Careful consideration of alternative uses within a total 
•rural development strategy would appear to be important. Because 
most existing experience - especially in the low veld - with 
irrigation is in the form of large estate or medium sized freehold 
farm use, it is desirable that detailed studies on how water 
availability could be used within the framework of the Rural 
Development Area programme to transform traditional agriculture be 
begun now. Water development does take time but so do devising and 
testing approaches to incorporate water availability in peasant 
oriented rural development programmes.
Power
Swaziland's brief period of self-sufficiency in power has ended.
SEB now buys half its power from ESCOM and the percentage is 
growing because sales have grown 13% a year while output has been 
static.
A detailed study of options has been carried out for Swaziland. It 
appears to be technically competent and broadly reasonable in its 
cost and economic assumptions. The picture it paints is depressing 
but does indicate some possibilities for action.
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The Lupohlu-Ezelweni/Edwaleni/Magudza group of hydroelectric devel­
opments should be undertaken. They would yield about 13MW and cover 
the increase in demand from 1979 to 1983/4 when they would be commis­
sioned, ie reduce 1983/4 ESCOM purchases to 1979 levels.
Economic projections suggest that in discounted cost and required 
tariff increase terms these hydro projects are competitive with 
purchases from ESCOM. In principle the discounted cost of the 
ESCOM/Hydro option is 1.8% higher than that of purchasing all 
additional power from ESCOM but a 1.8% difference is within the 
margin of error of the estimates.
The viability of the project to Swaziland would be increased if a
substantial proportion of the capital cost could be secured on
concessional (8% or less interest, 5 years or more grace period)
terms and if training and initial expatriate staff costs could be
«
secured as technical assistance (perhaps from the country 
supplying the main generation equipment).
Beyond those projects, which should be expedited unless they can 
be shown to jeopardize subsequent multipurpose water development 
very seriously, there do not appear to be additional cost efficient 
opportunities for single purpose power dams. However, it does seem 
probable that a multipurpose development programme would yield 
some additions to SEB1s domestic sources. It is very unlikely that 
these would cover the 1983/84 - 1990/91 increase in demand.
The Report's findings are that coal fired thermal stations are very 
uneconomic. The problem does not lie primarily with the cost of coal
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(which is only 10% of total discounted cost) but with the major 
scale economies of ESCOM's huge Rand stations.
The option of freezing ESCOM purchases at 1982 levels, developing 
hydro power through 1985 and thereafter adding five 15 MW coal 
units to 1999 (one each in 1987, 90, 93, 96 and 99) is however worth 
exploring further. It would reduce dependence on ESCOM from 60% 
in 1982 to 40% in 1992 and 30% in 2000. Its problem is one of cost 
if the plants are financed commercially.
Because the immediate projects are hydroelectric and are competitive, 
decisions on whether to proceed to coal fired thermal plant from 
1987 on can be postponed to - say - 1984. However, in the interim, 
explorations could be made as to the probability of securing 
subsidized (to say 5% with 5 years grace period) capital for the 
plants and technical assistance for training and initial period 
expatriate costs. A restudy should then be done in 1983/84 on the 
basis of updated demand estimates, cost calculations, knowledge of 
available and potential hydro capacity and likely average interest/ 
repayment requirements of a thermal programme.
Transport and Communications
This sector is critical to both long term development of options 
and to short term ability to meet contingencies. Ability to move 
goods, passengers, messages without transitting the Republic is 
essential to actual operation of any other dependency reduction and 
under some contingencies to the continued functioning of the 
Swaziland economy. The five critical projects are: Class B Satellite 
Earth Station, Matsapha Airport Extension, Railway Rehabilitation 
and Strengthening, Buildup of Domestic Lorry Capacity, Road Link to
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Mozambique.
Satellite Earth Station
We supported proposals for a Class B Satellite Earth Station to 
handle Swaziland's international telecommunications in the 
Interim Report. Additional data are now available from a SP and
T study.
Those data reinforce the case for the station. Total cost - 
including spares, training for Swazi's and expatriate staff 
salaries during the three years before qualified Swazi's were 
available - would total E 1.9 million at 1979 prices or - say - 
E 2.25 million for 1980/81 construction. Even using more cautious 
initial traffic estimates than the study, breakeven should be reached 
in year three, a cumulative cash flow surplus in year four and 
recovery of capital costs in five to six years.
We still consider the station as suitable for capital - plus 
training and expatriate staff - aid. However, on the data now 
available, it would appear that if an aid source cannot be located 
promptly, the project could be pursued using commercial finance.
Matsapha Airport
Matsapha Airport can be upgraded to Boeing 737 (or DC9 or Hercules) 
standard. It would not be an ideal site because of terrain , but would 
meet most ICAO standards and be comparable to or better than a 
number of other airports handling medium haul twinjets. Such an 
extension could be completed in twelve months and would - including
improved navigational and other instrumentation requirements 
cost E 6-8 million.
With such a facility Swaziland Airways could develop its 
regional services more effectively and add air cargo to passenger 
operations. Similarly other regional and international cargo and 
passenger carriers could be encouraged to fly to Swaziland.
However, the airport would be most critical in a contingency which 
disrupted normal air services to and/or flows of goods from the 
Republic.
The study for extension prepared by the Civil Aviation Branch 
using an international export advisor appears to us to be sound 
and to justify the decision to proceed with the Matsapha extension.
The proposed new airport east of Manzini appears to us to be a 
much less attractive project. It could not be completed for some 
years. It would cost at least E 20-25 million, perhaps E 40 million. 
Normal traffic would not cover recurrent costs, let alone servicing or 
repayment of capital cost. Traffic generation is likely to be 
slight. Certainly we do not consider that the proposed new airport 
can be justified on the basis of dependency reduction - for that 
purpose the Matsapha extension appears distinctly superior.
Railways
Swaziland Railways faces multiple problems as sketched in the 
Interim Report. Further studies have only increased the list:
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a. operating deficits rising to over E 611 thousand in 1977/8;
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b. inadequacy of existing corporate structure designed for a 
very different type of operation;
c. lack of adequate numbers of skilled Swazi maintenance, 
operating and managerial personnel;
d. inadequate traction and wagon fleets;
e. inadequate marshalling, interchange and workshop facilities;
f. poor coordination with Mozambique Railways;
g. poor condition of existing roadbed.
Unfortunately in none of these areas does an adequate detailed 
description of the nature and magnitude of the problems backed by 
coherent, quantified proposals for overcoming them exist. The 
Transmark report does provide a good deal of data and some notes 
toward structures, procedures and training but is radically 
incomplete e.g. it does not include training for footplate staff 
to take over provision of traction nor for heavy maintenance 
personnel.
The traction and wagon requirements to 1983/84 appear to include 
approximately 12 line and yard diesel engines, 400 plus dropside 
wagons, 100 plus high side wagons, 40 general bogies, 50 ventilated 
vans, 40 plus molasses tank cars (subject however to reduction if 
ethanol is produced from the molasses in Swaziland), 25 petroleum 
tank cars, 15 brake vans and 10 livestock vans.
Training needs appear to include replacing 20 to 25 expatriates,
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upgrading the skills of 100 serving citizen employees and 
training at least 100 citizens for new footplate and heavy 
maintenance posts.
While the maintenance report looks alarming and lists a vast 
number of faults, most are not individually serious yet, and all 
could be remedied at a moderate cost if regular maintenance can be 
restored within a year. New facilities needed include a marshalling 
and interchange yard near the Mozambique border a/id probably 
another at Phuzumoyo as well as a heavy maintenance unit. In 
addition extended sugar terminal facilities, a general import/ 
export godown and conversion of the present iron ore terminal to 
coal are needed in Maputo. The last group of facilities need 
serious negotiation with Mozambique Railways as to possibilities, 
costs, dates and operating arrangements.
Each of these issues is urgent. Several are complex. The total 
capital cost seems likely to exceed E 75 million and the expatriate 
and training costs perhaps E 5 million if the total programme is 
handled over 1980/81 - 1983/84. Detailed recommendations are hard 
to make in the absence of more complete and coherent data.
We advise as a matter of urgency that Swaziland study the existing 
reports to see how complete and adequate they are. If, as we believe, 
they are neither complete nor combined with workable proposals and 
cost estimates/ a new comprehensive study should be secured under 
technical assistance auspices. One railway transport advisor 
for one to two months on the terms of reference for such a study is 
needed. One evident present weakness of Swaziland Railways is lack 
of an internal planning unit. Such a unit, we believe, must be
started as a matter of urgency - presumably with an expatriate 
TA staff plus an inservice and overseas training programme 
for citizens. Until this is achieved there will be an endless 
series of demands for new external studies.
The comprehensive study is a matter of urgency as a complete 
railways programme cannot be drawn up until it is in hand. However, 
some action - e.g. on initial traction power and rolling stock 
buildup and the making good of deferred maintenance - should be 
begun at once. The former is an area in which capital assistance 
can be sought with fairly good prospects for success, the latter 
should be undertaken by the Railway itself.
Extensions to the railway pose somewhat different considerations. 
Sugar and coal development would be substantial beneficiaries from 
a line from Mpaka to Mhlume. However, that line would almost 
certainly not prove viable unless linked to the South African 
system and used to provide a short cut for non-mineral traffic 
from the Rand to Richards Bay and Durban now using circuitous 
routes.
Such a link cannot really be described as reducing dependence on 
South Africa even though it might - if favourable transit charges 
can be negotiated - increase the viability of the whole Swaziland 
railway system. Nor, however, if care is taken, need it 
substantially increase dependence. There are two key aspects in 
this regard. The first is to avoid making it so unilaterally 
dependent on SARR and H transit traffic that loss or reduction of 
that traffic would create an immediate, major financial crisis for 
Swaziland Railways. The second is to avoid Swaziland Railways being -
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or being perceived by Mozambique to be - a pawn used by South 
Africa to exert pressure on Mozambique by threatening to divert 
traffic now using Maputo to Durban/Richards Bay via Mhlume- 
Lavumisa.
Highways
Both internal economic integration and the development of 
alternative transport links to those with South Africa suggest 
early upgrading and bitumenizing of the Mpaka-Siteki Turnoff- 
Maphiveni-Lomahasha highway thereby improving links between the north­
east and Mbabane/Lobambo/Manzini and also providing a through bitumen 
highway route to Mozambique. These are included in the 1978/79 - 
1982/83 Main Roads Construction Programme. They deserve priority in 
funding and implementation.
An institutional question affects both rail and highway links with 
Mozambique. A Transport Sub-commission of transport officials from 
the two countries exists and meets on occasion. To date it 
apparently has dealt primarily with fairly narrow operational 
issues relating to the railway and the Swaziland representatives, 
have been largely expatriate railway officials. We suggest that 
consideration be given to use of this body to discuss a broader 
range of issues relating to road and rail traffic and that 
Swaziland members include senior citizen officials from relevant 
ministries including Planning. There is some reason to believe 
Mozambique would welcome such proposals and actions by Swaziland.
Lorry Transport
The lorry transport sector is dominated by Swaziland subsidiaries
of major South African firms. In addition construction contractors 
apparently hire South African owner operators for small scale 
haulage operations.
The second situation could be corrected fairly easily. Internal 
haulage licenses could be given only to domestically registered 
firms which would effectively exclude South African based owner 
operators. There is some confusion as to whether such regulations 
now exist. If they do, there is some evidence that they are not 
effectively enforced. Strong local preference could easily be 
enforced, at least for haulage in construction contracts involving 
the public sector, without conflict with SACUA in a variety of ways.
To launch a large scale road haulage company would pose more 
problems. The key to success for such a firm would be one of the 
half-dozen large contracts in pulp and sugar. The alternative of 
a Swaziland Railways Road Services Company is probably not feasible 
now given the urgent need to increase the Railways' capacity to 
rehabilitate, maintain and operate its existing rail services.
In practice such a road haulage company probably can only be 
established viably and stably as a joint venture between a 
Swaziland public sector entity and a foreign (ideally non-South 
African) road haulage company. Such a joint venture would be in a 
position to bid or negotiate on equal terms for government and 
public enterprise business and might be well placed to negotiate 
one or more sugar and pulp contracts. The technical and financial 
feasibility of a road haulage joint venture appears to us to be 
an appropriate topic for a detailed study, probably under technical 
assistance auspices.
- 28 -
Industry
Swaziland's most promising prospects for industry would appear to 
us to lie in processing and manufacturing based on Swaziland 
primary products. Such a sector would be likely to have a much 
firmer competitive foundation and to have more positive linkages 
with the rest of the economy than one dominated by assembly or 
labour-intensive operations linked to imports. This does not mean 
that no assembly or labour intensive operations can be viable,but 
that we feel they cannot provide an adequate dynamic for 
industrial development in Swaziland.
Raw-material-based industries have several positive aspects. They 
can provide substantial employment in the industry itself and in 
production/growing of inputs. In addition they can provide both 
higher value-added before export than present raw materials, and 
possibilities for new agricultural products linked to new exports 
as well as substituting for some current imports. Because 
Swaziland's strength appears to lie primarily in natural resources 
(including agricultural-ranching-forestry potential) industries 
based on them are likely to be more competitive internationally and 
domestically than ones primarily requiring high technology or 
cheap labour.
The following notes are intended as examples indicating some of the 
possibilities of the sector not as an exhaustive catalogue, still 
less as a formal list of projects of proven viability.
Export-oriented production of speciality food products such as 
stuffed cabbages would provide demand for cabbage, pig and cattle 
production. It could help in raising the income generating 
possibilities needed to sustain the Rural Development Area programmes
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and encourage building up a feed lot (or other fattening approach) 
sub-sector of cattle ranching. Taking the additional value added 
in agriculture as well as processing, it would be relatively labour- 
intensive and would have a high ratio of net to gross export earnings.
Hides and skins are currently exported raw. Medium scale tanning 
has proven viable in many developing countries. Further it can 
provide leather to local leather—products firms ranging from medium- 
scale leather shoe factories to artisanal production of bags and 
belts for speciality export markets. A study of the options open 
would appear to us to be well worth undertaking as on the face of 
it tanning/leather products could radically enhance the value to 
Swaziland of its hides, generate a number of jobs, and provide 
opportunities for viable craft and workshop enterprises.
A larger-scale and more technically complex opportunity is paper 
(or conceivably rayon). Swaziland has enough pulp to feed an 
economic sized factory. The ratio of shipping costs to value for 
pulp is high, absolutely and relative to paper. There are 
real water supply and pollution problems but it is not self-evident 
that these are insuperable. However, a new joint-venture partner 
would be needed - Courtaulds now finds its Swaziland interests 
peripheral to main lines of group development and, while a competent 
manager of the existing pulp mill,is most unlikely to wish to 
devote personnel, time and finance to forward integration into 
paper or rayon,whatever its medium term economic viability. A 
medium-scale (by international standards) paper or rayon company 
might take a very different view. The chief potential for such a 
project would be foreign exchange earnings (critical given 
Swaziland's rapidly expanding trade imbalance) as the forestry 
sector already exists and neither a paper nor a rayon staple fibre
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factory would provide a large number of jobs.
On the domestic market side, vegetable oil is an evident example. 
Cotton seed is available in increasing quantity: sunflower can be 
grown. At present the cotton seed is exported raw to the Republic 
and vegetable oil imported. Oil extraction and refining would 
provide a net foreign exchange saving. It would also allow 
development of sunflower growing by providing a domestic market 
and would make oil cake available at lower cost to the domestic 
cattle and poultry industries. If an economic size plant generates 
output surplus to Swaziland's requirements, there are several net 
vegetable oil importers in Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean.
A more technically complex domestic market oriented example is the 
proposed ethanol plant. At petroleum prices of $40 per barrel cif 
Durban,ethanol production from molasses for motor fuel (gasohol, 
diesohol) can make positive contributions to gross domestic 
product and to the net foreign exchange position. This project also 
illustrates the detailed issues which need to be considered case by 
case:
a. the conflicting points in respect to value added and revenue, 
especially in the SACU context;
b. the problems of acquiring enough technical and economic knowledge 
to negotiate effectively with foreign firms and to identify 
alternative investors to improve the bargaining context.
Some of these have already been dealt with in more detail by a 
detailed brief on this project prepared by one of the members of
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our team for Planning.
They are further illustrated by the fact that a reputable 
European firm, preparing a feasibility study for a similar plant 
in another country in the region, came up with capital-cost 
estimates per unit of output twice as high as those in the proposal 
before Swaziland. This related to the European firm, despite its 
general expertise, being unaware of the recent Brazilian technological 
advances and operating experience. Some aspects of the assessments 
in the Swaziland paper proj ect study suggest that the negative 
conclusions reached there flow from similar gaps in the knowledge 
and perceptions of the consultants.
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Alternatives to the Customs Union
It would not be appropriate for us to recommend that Swaziland stay
in or leave SACU. That decision depends on factors outside our terms 
of reference. The Government of Swaziland does not at present intend 
to leave SACU. (It may well seek to negotiate changes ~ e.g. to permit 
other regional trading arrangements without conflict with SACU; or to 
reduce the lag between accrual and payments from the revenue pool.)
Events could, however, induce - or even compel - Swaziland to leave SACU.
We therefore recommend that, as an important part of contingency planning, 
Swaziland prepare a general structure of alternative customs arrangements,
for the eventuality that these become necessary or desirable.
We recommend that, at an appropriate stage, early in the preparation of such a 
structure, Swaziland should consult Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Malawi,
Zambia and Zimbabwe, and possibly other members of the Southern Africa 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). (In our judgement, security 
of information should not be an overriding consideration, as compared with full 
discussion among interested parties; 1? SA must be well aware that BLS are 
sufficiently sensible to make economic contingency plans, and that these are 
not threats or politically hostile acts .)  Since the break-up of the Central %
African Federation, the three successor states have pursued distinct policies 
towards SACU. The new situation in Central Africa strongly indicates:
(a) that joint plans should soon be prepared, for the contingency 
that one or more SACU members might in future seek to denounce 
the treaty, by BLS in conjunction with Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozam­
bique and Malawi .and possibly other members of SADCC.
(b) that these countries explore together the short-run 
possibilities for trade and payments policies (including possibly
CHAPTER III
a payments clearing house), to promote balanced expansion of 
mutual trade and decreased dependence on RSA while SACU remains.
We accordingly recommend that Swaziland seeks such a multinational 
conference, involving Customs and Finance as well as External Affairs 
representation, to map out areas of agreement on these matters before 
finalising its own contingency plan for an independent revenue tariff.
The contingency plan, for an independent customs system in the event that 
Swaziland at some time in the future change its present stance and decides 
to leave SACU, should base that system on the following general principles:
(a) Any new customs tariff should be as simple as possible. The 
existing SACU tariff is an extremely complex mixture of revenue 
and protective duties. For a country like Swaziland - with high 
imports (and border policing costs), per person and per unit of 
national income such a tariff would be unduly difficult (and very 
costly) to administer independently, and would invite evasion. 
Moreover, the protective elements in the SACU tariff are designed 
to protect South African industry, and have little relevance to 
Swaziland. If Swaziland adopted its own tariff system outside 
SACU, its new (and necessarily expanded) customs administration 
should be asked to operate something very much simpler than the 
present SACU tariff system.
(b) One element in this simplicity should be that similar items 
should carry the same rate of duty. Where (as in the present 
SACU tariff) different types of the same goods bear different 
rates of duty in order to protect particular South African 
industries, importers can easily make false declarations so as to 
reduce their duty liability.
- 34 -
(c) The other element in simplicity should be that only a few rates
of duty should be charged. The number of different rates in the
SACU tariff runs into the hundreds.
(d) The main purpose of any independent Swazi tariff should be to
raise revenue. We do not exclude the possibility that the Swaziland 
government may wish to use the tariff to protect local industry,
and we suggest below appropriate methods for doing so. However, as* 
pages 27-30 of this Report show, there are many more important 
and more readily remediable obstacles to Swaziland's industrial 
growth than her tariff structure, even within SACU.
(e) Although the structure of any independent tariff in Swaziland
would depart substantially from that of the SACU tariff, there 
would be some advantage in not creating too great a gap between 
Swaziland's duty levels and those of RSA. Swaziland has a scarcity 
of administrators, and if Swaziland's duties are far higher than 
RSA's, there could be substantial smuggling from RSA into Swaziland. 
If they are far lower, the Swaziland government could be unneces­
sarily foregoing revenue.
We suggest that there should be a single-column schedule. This is most 
readily accommodated in the GATT and Lome arrangements; is simplest to 
operate; reduces the opportunity for evasion through false declarations * 
of origin; and permits imports from the cheapest possible source. If, 
however, these advantages are outweighed by new options for interregional 
trade, special preferential arrangements could be included in a separate 
schedule. It is partly to clarify these alternatives that we advise a 
conference along the lines indicated above.
We suggest that a tariff structure roughly on the following lines would
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be appropriate for Swaziland if it decided to leave SACU,
Table 3.1: A Possible Independent Tariff Schedule
Category of imports Ad valorem duty rate
Basic foodstuffs (e.g. foodgrains) 
Hand tools
Simple agricultural implements
Free
Other foodstuffs 
Machinery 
Raw materials 
Construction materials
10%
Other goods of general consumption 
(e.g. clothing, household goods) 35%
Luxury imports and traditional revenue 
items (tobacco, liquor, petrol) 50 - 100%
If present price levels in Swaziland are roughly equivalent to the 
cheapest available world prices plus the level of existing SACU import 
duties and distribution costs, such a structure should have little 
impact on the overall level of prices - on the assumption that imports 
are procured from the cheapest available sources, either through 
individual market competition or as a result of actions by the Government 
of Swaziland to exploit economies of scale or bargaining advantages.
But where the existing tariff is supplemented by quantitative restrictions 
(QRs) for protective purposes, and production in RSA is under monopolistic 
control, existing internal prices could be greater than world prices plus 
import duties. We understand, however, that such QRs are being phased 
out; such cases should therefore be exceptional. Furthermore, we assume 
that Swaziland would, outside SACU, always prefer tariffs to QRs; the
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latter have identical protective effect to an appropriate tariff, but 
raise no revenue, more severely restrict consumer choice, and give more 
incentive to smuggle. Hence it is reasonable to compare Swaziland's 
present (SACU) position, and its position outside SACU on the suggested 
tariff structure above, assuming no QRs in both cases.
✓
If competitive conditions in RSA industry are such that internal prices 
are less than import prices plus duty, an independent Swazi tariff out­
side SACU, on the lines indicated above, could lead to an increase 
in price levels. For certain products (e.g. some capital goods) South 
African prices are highly competitive, and Swaziland would probably 
continue to import such products from RSA if they are available. In 
such cases, the new tariff we propose would involve an increase in prices. 
We do not have sufficient information to judge how common such cases 
might be. In any event, competitive conditions change over time, and it 
would not be possible for us to judge now how competitive South African 
products will be at such time as Swaziland decides to leave SACU. But 
it seems probable that such a tariff would involve some price rises.1
We have tried to compare:
(a) revenue received from SACU in each calendar year from 1974 to 
1977;
(b) revenue that would, on certain assumptions set out on pp. 38-39, *»
have been received from the tariff outlined in Table 2.1 in each 
of these years.
It could be argued that under (a) revenue accruing from SACU is more
1 Of course, these price rises would affect consumers in Swaziland large 1’- 
to the extent that they continued to buy the goods in question (i.e. 
could not satisfactorily subsitute cheaper ones). To exactly that 
extent, the Government of Swaziland would obtain extra income revenue, 
enabling it to compensate consumers as a whole through lower indirect 
taxes, higher subsidies, or extra public expenditure.
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appropriate for comparison; that the delay in payments of SACU pool 
revenues, together with the rapid growth of imports, means that each 
year's receipts seriously understate accruals for that year; and 
hence that our (a) above gives much too low a figure for the revenue 
from SACU. However, the operational comparison for a Treasury is 
between sums actually received from alternative sources at the same 
time. Future receipts are affected by inflation, currency fluctuations 
and other unknowns; and the delayed payments built into SACU are a real
cost. If accruals (and not receipts) under SACU are to be compared
with receipts under an alternative system, then the loss of value 
due to delays in the payments of such receipts (inflation, lost 
interest) must also be allowed for.
In calculating (b) above, we assume - for reasons given below - 
that the price, and therefore the volume, of imports in each category
would not change much as a result of a decision by Swaziland to leave
SACU. We also believe, for reasons given on page 33, that the tariff
rate in each category would have to remain rather close to the RSA
rate. Hence a decision to leave SACU would principally:
(i) decrease Swaziland's revenue, because the 1.42 enhancement 
factor is lost, and because the right to tariffs from the pool 
on Central Government imports vanishes;
(ii) increase Swaziland's revenue, because the 2-year lag in pay­
ments disappears at a time of high growth in the real value
and price of imports - and hence in the value of tariff
revenues, whether received or delayed, whether or not Swaziland
is in SACU.
Our central finding, that in 1974-77 (ii) probably outweighed (i),
much surprised us; rests on several assumptions, spelt out in pp.
38-9, that are uncertain even for 1974-77 and even more uncertain as
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extrapolations as to the 1980s, when the decision about SACU will be 
taken; and in particular, compare a certain loss (i) and an uncertain 
gain (ii) - uncertain because future real growth, future inflation, 
their effect on imports into Swaziland, and the immunity of import 
prices and volumes to a decision to leave SACU are all themselves
uncertain. Contingency planning requires a sophisticated econometric y
■<
exercise which we, with the information available to us, could not
V
usefully have undertaken.
We understand that such forecasts exist in the Government but we have 
not been given access to them. In view of the importance and diffi­
culty of such contingency planning, and the inevitable preferences 
that develop within any arm of Government for well-tried procedures, 
we strongly advise an independent, external assessment of the revenue 
effects of the options, based on full information. Strict confiden­
tiality should be possible, but is anyway much less important than a 
reliable, up-to-date and easily updatable revenue comparison.
Table 3.2, inserted as an appendix to this chapter, estimates the 
revenue obtainable in each calendar year 1974 to 1977 from the tariff 
outlined in Table 3.1. Table 3.2 assumes that existing import values 
as recorded in trade statistics are equivalent to cheapest available 
world prices plus South African customs duties, and that Swaziland 
would import from cheapest world sources. On these (admittedly unsafe)* 
assumptions, the change to a new tariff would not affect retail prices. 
We have therefore not taken account of any reduction in imports which 
might result from price rises.
Table 3.2, then, estimates for the main chapters:
(a) A rough average rate of duty that might have been charged by 
Swaziland in an arrangement independent of SACU - an average 
related to the SACU import tariff;
(b) The value of imports (in each year 1974-77) net of duty, 
which are equivalent to imports at world prices at the 
Swaziland border;
(c) The revenue which would have been raised in each year by 
applying duties (a) to values (b).
Table 3.3 compares the revenue in each year 1974-77 from (a) the 
independent tariff structure of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 and (b) SACU 
customs and excise pool revenue actually received.
Table 3.3: Actual and Notional Customs Duty Receipts E mn
Year Actual Receipts Notional Receipts
1974 17.3 19.9
1975 18.2 27.7
1976 14.4 36.3
1977 32.5 41.5
Table 3.3 suggests the surprising conclusion that, over this period, 
the Swaziland Government would have obtained more revenue if it had 
been outside SACU, while consumers would have been no worse off.1 
However:-
(a) The column "Notional Receipts" in Table 3.3 is too high, because 
it applied our suggested rates (Table 3.1) to total imports in 
each category. In fact, if Swaziland left SACU, duties levied on 
goods imports for Central Government (directly and for local gov­
ernment would of course be purely intra-Government accounting
1 This conclusion is strenghtened by the fact that we have made no 
allowance for "outside SACU" excise duties in our calculations. 
But these would probably make very little difference.
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transfers contributing nothing to net Government revenue.1 We 
could not obtain reliable estimates of Central Government goods 
imports for 1974-77. In the case of Botswana, however, a 
very rough estimate suggests that in 1977 Government goods 
imports were about 15% of total goods imports. Most such 
imports, however, are in categories where fairly low duty **
rates are proposed for any "post-SACU" tariff schedule (Table 3.3) 
- e.g. construction and maintenance equipment and raw materials. 
Hence the over-estimate in the last column of Table 3.3, due to 
the inclusion of "duties" on Government imports, is extremely 
unlikely to exceed (15% of E 32.5 mn), or E 4.9 mn, for 1977.
If we deduct this from the Table 3.3 estimate of E 41.5 mn, the 
remaining E 36.6 mn of notional receipts remains significantly 
above the E 32.5 mn actually obtained in SACU. This conclusion 
also applies to the other years.
(b) The main reason for the surprising result of Table 3.3 is that 
1972-77 saw very rapid increases in the value of Swaziland's 
imports. Between 1973 and 1977, the total value of imports rose 
by 31.4% per annum. Over a two-year period, this would amount 
to an increase of 73%. The SACU arrangements - to put things 
very crudely - deny Swaziland most of this (due to the time-lag * 
between accruals and cash transfers) but provide a 42% enhance-*
1 This applies also to direct imports by local government, which 
however are relatively very small. However, it cannot be argued 
for parastatals, which are not supposed to run at a loss, and which 
must therefore be presumed to pass on tariffs to their customers. 
Note that, at present, the SACU pool pays out duties (times 1.42) 
to Swaziland on all imports, although Central Government is not 
required to pay into the pool any tariffs on its own direct imports 
(as opposed to imports of local governments and parastatals); this 
fact, together with the high "standard rate" of duty (about 20%) 
paid out of the pool on all Government imports (as against the much 
lower rate that in fact applies to many of these imports if bought 
privately), substantially boosts the "Actual Receipts" column of 
Table 3.3.
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ment of import-duty revenue. Hence a switch to an independent 
system appears to "gain" more (by removing the time lag) than 
it "loses" (by giving up the enhancement). However, this is 
a very crude comparison, and is heavily dependent on what may 
turn out to be an exceptional rate of growth in the money 
value of imports. Succesful negotiation for a reduced delay 
in SACU pool payments, even along the modest and probably 
attainable lines proposed at Para. 4.18 of our Interim Report, 
would substantially reduce the apparent revenue attractions 
of the "independent tariff" option.
(c) All these calculations assume that the efficiency of revenue 
collection, as indicated by the proportion of imports identified 
and the proportion of due duty on them in fact collected, is 
not altered by a decision to operate a separate tariff. To 
achieve such efficiency, substantial enlargement of the customs 
department would be required. The capital and training costs 
could almost certainly be obtained from aid donors on easy 
terms. The recurrent costs, including the "hidden" drain on 
scarce administrative skills, could not. Estimates made to
us imply roughly doubling the size and costs of the Customs 
and Excise Department, if an independent tariff is to be 
efficiently run. The costs of this would need to be estimated 
and deducted from data for future years corresponding to the 
last column of Table 3.3.
(d) We have emphasised our basic assumption that, if Swaziland 
withdrew from SACU, it could obtain imports at a price roughly 
equivalent to present import prices less import duty. In such 
a case the imposition of duties at levels roughly equivalent 
to those in the South African tariff would have little impact
on prices. But if our assumption is not justified and import 
prices turned out to be higher, the establishment of a separate 
tariff would lead to prices which were higher than would be the 
case with SACU, and consequently a lower level of consumption. 
Where the elasticity of demand for particular imports is low 
(i.e. consumption is not greatly affected by higher prices) 
this need have little impact on revenue. Indeed, revenues 
could even rise. But on items where the elasticity of demand 
is high (including many less essential commodities on which we 
have proposed higher levels of duty) there could well be 
revenue losses.
On the other hand, many SACU tariffs are designed to protect 
domestic producers, and hence they bear most heavily against 
cheap imports. In such cases, the present tariff margin on 
goods consumed mainly by the poor could substantially exceed 
the import duty rates which we have proposed. The retail 
price of such products could well fall with the introduction 
of the new tariff, and both consumption and revenue might 
increase. Of course, this would mean that any protective 
effect was reduced by the switch from SACU to the new tariff. 
Nevertheless, on balance, we expect that (because so many RSA 
products are in fact highly competitive, and now cost Swaziland 
considerably less than "world prices plus SACU tariff") the 
non-SACU tariff would somewhat raise prices; that the impact 
of this rise would fall mainly on price-elastic products; 
and that revenues would therefore have fallen short of the 
figures in the last column of Table 3.3.
In spite of these reservations, the estimates of Table 3.3 do suggest
that leaving SACU might involve less budgetary cost to Swaziland tha::
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has been feared. The outcome would depend mainly on, first, the 
extent to which imports can be obtained at South African prices less 
South African import duties and, secondly, the rate of growth of 
Swaziland imports both in total and in different tariff classes.
The fact that SACU cash flows appear to grow very rapidly, according 
to current estimates, from the levels of Table 3.3 does not of itself 
affect the argument. The real issue is whether these revenues would 
be caught in an independent system or not.
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
Table 3.:2 National import duty receipts by category . 1974-7, from tariff proposed in Table 3.1
R 000 R 000 R 000 R 000
Commodity Assumed 
present 
tax rate 
%
Proposed 
tax rate 
%
1974
Imports Revenue 
net of 
tax
1975
Imports Revenue 
net of 
tax
1976
Imports Revenue 
net of 
tax
1977
Imports Revenue 
net of 
tax
Cereals & 0 0 3,076 0 4,258 0 4,610 0 5,889 0
cereal pre­
parations
Other foods
Wine
Beer
Spirits
Cigarettes
Other Bever­
0
5
50
100
100
20
10
10
50
100
100
25
4,662
478
663
380
358
702
466
48
332
380
358
176
7,139
781
1,159
743
793
763
714
78
580
743
793
191
9,446
838
2,321
837
551
711
945
84
1,161
837
551
178
10,162
1,604
1,441
981
627
742
1,016
160
721
981
627
185
ages/Tobacco 
Crude mater­ 0 10 652 65 858 86 1,186 119 1 ,132 113
ials
Petroleum 100 100 5,128 5,128 6,417 6,417 8,796 8,796 10,667 10,667
products 
Other minerals 0 10 582 58 932 93 1,343 134 2 ,327 233
fuel lubricant 
Animal and veg 20 10 353 35 468 47 398 40 518 52
etable oil fat 
Manufactured 0 10 2,438 244 4,154 415 2,901 290 4,691 469
chemical fert­
ilisers
Cleaning toilet 30 35 652 228 1,247 436 1,345 471 1,588 556
.Commodity
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 
R OOO
Assumed Proposed 1974
present tax rate Imports Revenue
tax rate % net of
% tax
Chemical ele­
ment & Com­
pounds
Insecticides, 
fungicides, etc 
Medical & Phar­
maceutical Pro­
ducts
Other chemical 
products 
Rubber manu­
factures 
Paper manufac­
tures
Textile yarns, 
fabrics, etc. 
Cement 
Iron, steel 
Metal con­
tainers
Metal household 
equipment 
Other SITC 6 
Agricultural 
machines & 
implements 
Machines for 
general industry
10
10
15
10
30
15
20
5
10
10
25
20
5
10
10
15
10
30
15
35
10
10
10
35
20
5
10
2,114
1,252
1,350
1,384
515
2,132
2,029
974
1,284
634
334
3,022
2,929
2,406
211
125
203
138
155
320
710
97
128
63
117
604
146
241
Table 3.2 (Continued)
R OOO R OOO R OOO
1975 1976 1977
Imports Revenue Imports Revenue Imports Revenue
net of net of net of
tax tax tax
1,526 153 3,564
1,407 141 915
1,096 164 1,310
1,518 152 1,741
578 174 744
2,040 306 1,957
2,271 795 2,835
749 75 796
2,227 223 2,668
752 75 1,586
682 239 729
3,133 627 4,252
3,220 161 2,931
2,929 293 6,664
356 3,135 314
91 1,516 152
197 1,230 185
i
174 2,219 222 ^
on
223 1,156 347 1
293 2,247 337
992 2,583 904
80 1,385 138
267 2,637 264
159 1,714 171
255 845 296
850 4,358 872
147 2,688 134
666 3,090 309
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R OOO
Commodity Assumed
present
Proposed 
tax rate
1974
Imports Revenue
tax rate 
%
% net of 
tax
Machines & 
appliances 
n.e.s. (not 
electric)
5 10 1,725 172
Electric gen­
erators & dis­
tribution 
equipment
5 10 1,144 114
Domestic elec­
tric equipment
25 35 234 82
Telecommuni­
cations equip­
ment
20 20 588 118
Passenger motor 
cars
100 100 1,565 1,565
Other road 
motor vehicles
30 30 3,574 1,072
Road motor 
vehicle parts
20 20 2,503 501
Other SITC 7 10 10 4,815 482
Plumbing, heat­
ing, lighting 
fittings
15 20 527 105
Furniture 25 35 863 302
Clothing 35 35 4,102 1,436
Footwear 30 35 773 271
Other SITC 8 25 30 2,853 856
Commodities not 
classified by 
kind
20 20 10,373 2,075
Total 19,927
Table 3.2 (Continued)
R OOO 
1975
Imports Revenue
net of
tax
R 000 
1976
Imports Revenue
net of
tax
R OOO 
1977
Imports Revenue
net of
tax
2,369 237 3,132 313 3,223 322
1,312 131 3,153 315 2,677 268
i
323 113 262 92 478 167
3,931 786 7,114 1,423 818 164
2,410 2,410 2,215 2,215 2,890 2,890
3,837 1,151 9,166 2,750 8,418 2,526
2,568 514 3,612 722 3,768 754
8,026 803 10,106 1,011 7,182 718
477 95 668 134 895 179
936 328 1,542 540 1,720 602
4,720 1,652 4,862 1,702 6,001 2,101
1,178 412 1,140 399 1,263 442
2,546 764 4,014 1,204 3,420 1,026
20,797 4,159 25,687 5,137 44,793 8,959
27,726 36,313 41,543
Snnrcp-s ol 'Cood-s: Subs! i l.ulion .111 d Pi vorsiTicf iLion
The dominant source of goods to meet Swaziland's demand is South 
Africa. This is true in the sense that most imports - about 90% 
judging by admittedly imprecise trade data - are Republic products.
But it is also true in two additional senses. Many of Swaziland's 
imports from other sources came via the Republic (and are sometimes 
listed statistically as of RSA origin) and via South African based 
firms. There are few direct imports and these are concentrated on a 
few foreign-aid projects and a handful of large enterprises by the 
SEB. Finally/ imports are the dominant source of goods purchased in 
Swaziland - in 1976 imports were equivalent to 70% of GDP at market 
prices, or to over 80% excluding households' consumption of their 
own products (the so call "subsistence sector"). Imports categorised 
as of South African origin, therefore, were in 1976 equivalent to 
over 60% of market-price GDP. In 1978 the ratio was probably higher 
since imports had risen by 70% and even allowing for inflation the 
growth of GDP was probably not much over 50%.
Causes
One reason - and by no means a minor one - for the heavy dependence 
on imports is that Swaziland is a very small economy. Further its 
natural resources are rather specialised (e.g. mountainous areas 
suitable for pulpwood; soils containing iron ore, land highly suitable 
for citrus and sugar if water is made available) so that the 
development of production has been concentrated along a few lines, 
providing the exports to pay for imports.
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ClIAPTbR IV
Similarly the facts that South Africa is both economically large and 
contiguous to Swaziland are major contributing factors to the 
concentration of imports on South Africa. This is, to a degree, 
natural - the United Kingdom is Ireland's largest import supplier 
and Germany is Denmark's.
Because South Africa is next door, Swaziland can more easily know 
what RSA firms can supply what goods than it can, for instance, with 
Sweden or the UK. Because banks are common to the two countries 
credit (and credit references) are easier to obtain. Proximity also 
reduces the time from order to delivery and the uncertainty as to 
how long that time will be, thus reducing the ratio of inventory to 
sales needed. For many products South Africa is - given the advantages 
on transport cost, finance charges and delivery time/stocks needed - a 
low-cost source of supply.
These causes are reinforced by the fact that most medium or large 
scale enterprises are linked to the Republic. Many are branches or 
local subsidiaries of South African firms. Others are managed by 
South Africans and/or form part of the South African regions of global 
corporate groups (until its new Mbabane Regional Headquarters is 
complete even CDC falls in this category). Even in respect to 
apparently local firms, many owners or managers - whether resident or 
citizen - have personal and business ties with the Republic. For these 
firms the "natural" place to look is RSA; but the naturalness is 
partly a matter of habit and of their own South African links rather 
than of inherent economic logic.
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Finally, these causes are massively reinforced by the Rand Monetary
Area and South African Customs Union Arrangements. The RMA removes 
exchange rate fluctuation risks on transactions with the Republic 
as well as dispensing with exchange control formalities on them.
SACU gives South African goods protection against non-SACU goods 
in the Swaziland market and has limited the degree to which special 
encouragement could be given to Swaziland production for domestic 
market.
This is not to argue that' the RMA has not given benefits - there are 
costs and risks in managing an independent currency, especially if it 
is a weak one. However, Botswana's experience - albeit with a 
relatively strong currency - suggests these by no means necessarily 
outweigh the gains and possibilities. Similarly, SACU has provided 
some net revenue transfers and reduced problems of tax collection and 
administration. However, Chapter III indicates that the net cash flow 
gain from SACU is not as large as is commonly supposed - and may have 
been negative in some years - while a recent paper by the 
Consultant to the Commissioner of Customs shows that a Swaziland 
Customs and Excise service outside SACU would be administratively
*feasible and would have a relatively low ratio of cost to revenue.
The point made here is that RMA and SACU increase the natural forces 
working toward a high proportion of imports in the Swaziland purchase 
basket and a dominant South African share in imports.
*In general we agree with the points made in the paper. Our main 
doubt is on costs. However, we would not expect them to exceed 
2% of gross customs and excise revenue. While some collection 
problems would arise on "shopping" and goods brought by returning 
workers these do not appear to us - any more than to the author 
of the paper - to be insuperable. The number of practicable 
routes to main population and commercial centres in Swaziland is 
limited. Trekking for miles across mountainous terrain and lowveld 
scrub to evade duty on "shopping" and goods brought back after 
working on the Rand is unlikely to be attractive enough to make a 
national system of Customs hopelessly leaky.
Implications
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The marked dependence of the Swaziland economy on imports and on 
imports from RSA in particular has several implications and 
consequences.
First, it limits opportunities for domestic production, over and 
above the constraint imposed by the size of the economy and its 
range of available resources. This is particularly evident in 
respect to construction and agriculture.
Second, in respect to some commodities it raises costs. Petroleum 
products, textiles and garments are examples.
Third, it limits the opportunities for, and competiveness of, 
domestic commercial enterprises. They are at a distinct disadvantage 
to branches and local subsidiaries of South African commercial houses 
with their better knowledge of, and contacts with, South African 
sources.
Fourth, it creates problems in respect to external relations, both 
with other states in the region and with international and bilateral 
aid agencies. In both cases, opportunities for cooperation are not 
enhanced by the present degree of dependence on RSA sources.
Fifth, it raises risks in respect to future dependability of supply - 
particularly, but not solely, of petroleum products - because of the 
possibilities of external sanctions against or internal disturbances 
in the Republic. These are quite independent of any action Swaziland 
does or does not take. For example, in the event of oil sanctions,
whatever assurances may be given, our judgement is that South 
African oil supplies to Swaziland would at best be cut sharply and 
at worst halted, whether Swaziland imposed sanctions herself or not.
In principle there are two offsetting gains. The first pertains to 
export specialisation in general and certainly has a good deal of 
validity for a small economy with specific resource advantages, such 
as Swaziland. This is that natural resources and natural-resource- 
baeed industries should be developed so as to capture economies of 
scale and to achieve the greatest income flows to Swaziland. Clearly 
this does imply the correctness of forest exploitation for export, 
whether as pulp and pit props or - better, to the degree that it is 
economically and technically feasible - as paper, cardboard and 
furniture. However, such activity is not inconsistent with greater 
production for the home market - particularly in food, construction, 
and manufacturing suitable for relatively small workshops and plants - 
than has been achieved to date.
The second supposed advantage, access to the South African market for 
manufactured goods and secondary crops, is more hypothetical and 
apparent than achieved or real. Swaziland manufacturing based on 
natural resources - e.g. pulp and potentially paper - is not tied to 
the South African market. Swaziland cannot compete in labour-intensive 
industries against South African subsidized "homeland"-based ventures. 
Internal reforms (to reduce African unrest and unemployment) or 
emergence of an African-ruled South Africa would increase, not 
remove, this limitation. Swaziland industries - e.g. fertilizer, 
levision sets - based on peculiarities of drawback, rebate, 
censing and other provisions of the South African tariff - live 
rry dangerously. They can literally be abolished by a stroke of a pen
in Pretoria - as the textile/garment factory was. Further, given the
*
highly cartelized and restrictive nature of the South African 
industrial sector, they will face severe problems in winning and 
holding any important market share in any product of real interest 
to one or more of South Africa's major private or public sector 
corporate groups.
What Can Usefully Be Done?
In considering appropriate courses of action it is useful to divide 
the question into three categories:
1. goods for which local production might be substituted;
2. petroleum products;
3. general imports.
Each poses rather different problems and possibilities and each would 
appear to have rather different appropriate programmes.
Our discussion of domestic production does not purport to be complete, 
nor to attempt a detailed identification of products. To do so would go 
far beyond our terms of reference and capabilities. What it seeks to do 
are to suggest a few priority areas and a few potentially useful 
approaches. It is likely to be most useful if read in conjunction with 
Chapter II of our Interim Report.
Import Substitution and Public Policy
A broader range of goods could be produced in Swaziland with 
substantial benefits to GDP, to external balance, and to the internal
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economic integration of Swaziland. Because the immediately identified 
clusters of such goods - construction, food, craft and small scale 
manufacturing - are relatively labour-intensive, their expansion is 
critical to expanding Swazi employment in Swaziland to meet the needs 
of the growing population and to reduce employment dependence on 
South Africa.
As we have noted earlier, the availability of more genuinely national 
construction capacity and goods would ease relations with overseas 
aid agencies and some aspects of their building might be made part of 
aid agreements. We have also pointed out that, at least in the medium 
term, national water resource development is critical to employment 
generation in agriculture and agro-industry as well as to food supply 
and generation of demand for local small scale manufacturing and 
construction.
Identifying specific possibilities for domestic-market-oriented 
production is a lengthy exercise. Further,it is one that can usefully 
be undertaken only if there are identified potential users of the 
data - whether public or private-sector, actual entrepreneurs or 
promotional and finance companies. We believe that a systematic survey 
of what is produced, how, on what scale,and what imported, would be a 
useful baseline,especially if complemented by data on which of the now- 
imported items were typically domestically produced in small low- 
income economies. The ILO might provide technical assistance toward 
such a study.
iowever, the data will not by themselves result in production (beyond 
production of reports). For real effect, they need to be fed into
promotional and investment bodies, to be used in designing training 
programmes, and to be made available to potential investors - Swazi, 
joint-venture and foreign. Bits and pieces are done in each of these 
areas - in seme cases done well - but there does appear both to be a 
lack of an overall approach (e.g. technical and artisanal education 
and industrial development to date proceed more in parallel than 
together) and no real consideration of effects of these efforts upon 
economic dependence.
Beyond that, questions of general public policy frameworks arise.
These are not limited to protection in the tariff sense nor ruled out 
from the start by SACU membership. Some measures in fact would amount 
to removing de facto discrimination against domestic (and in some 
cases non-South African external) sources; others, while preferential, 
are broadly consistent with SACU and are practised in South Africa.
The following notes are intended to be not exhaustive but suggestive, 
in both coverage and depth.
Removal of Obstacles
Many licensing procedures and standards for goods and construction in 
Swaziland appear to be closely modelled on those of RSA. Building 
regulations and phyto-sanitary restrictions are examples.- These may or 
may not be appropriate in the Republic. They are certainly easier for 
South African firms or their local subsidiaries to meet than for small 
Swazi enterprises (or foreign firms from outside the Republic).
Doutless some of the provisions are appropriate. However, there seems 
to be a case for a general review of licensing provisions and standards, 
asking these questions.
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a) Are these regulations needed at all? Do they really serve any 
purpose?
b) If so, is the form of the requirement appropriate to what 
Swaziland needs?
c) How could the requirement be restructured so that - at the 
minimum - they are neutral between small Swazi and larger RSA- 
based enterprises?
A parallel case exists for goods which are dumped or pushed by
discriminatory business practices. Swazi commercial and production
establishments could usefully be encouraged to make complaints (to
Commerce and Industries and/or Treasury). These could then be checked.
Where valid, pressure could be brought to bear on the South African
authorities by the Treasury. If this proved unavailing, administrative
*or fiscal action could - well within SACU - be taken to offset the 
dumping or block the unfair business practice.
Administration and Suasion
Licensing and administration can play a more active role in respect 
to favouring certain types of enterprises, e.g. bakeries.4- For 
certain types of activities - e.g. small-scale construction - it is 
possible to limit the issue of licences (or awarding of contracts) to 
Swazi nationals. This may be de facto rather than de jure - e.g. by 
use of citizenship of owners and of artisans, or by a required 
percentage of local purchases combined with some discretion.
* Customs management for SACU is based on the RSA Act. That Act has 
stringent anti-dumping provisions. By analogy those provisions apply 
pari passu to trade among SACUA members.
This is a complex issue, as South Africa subsidises bakers' flour 
purchases but not flour exports, so that an "export subsidy" offset 
case for administrative action also arises.
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Larger firms are subject to "moral suasion". If specifically requested 
to increase local purchases - especially if also given lists of local 
producers of certain goods or services now purchased from the 
Republic - they will respond to some extent if they view the 
government's interest as serious. For example, Peak Timbers and OK 
Bazaars will normally as a matter of convenience buy South African 
unless pushed. If pressed they could and would switch to local sources • 
including local contractors for small construction jobs - where quality 
and cost are not very different. Again this is a policy followed on a 
very large scale in the Republic and - more directly to the point - 
incorporated in some of Botswana's arrangements (e.g. with De Beers in 
respect of the Jwaneng diamond mine development).
Fiscal
There is probably room for selective, limited subsidies in respect to 
inputs, e.g. seed and simple agricultural implements used primarily by 
local producers. However, care needs to be taken in each case to 
identify the actual beneficiaries and to incorporate the subsidies in 
a total programme which will actually increase production, not merely 
the profits of a few existing producers. Selective, cautious use of 
output subsidies may also have a role. However, the example of maize - 
in which the end result is generally believed to be merely to enhance 
milling surpluses while discouraging marketed production of maize (see 
our Interim Report) - is a warning that great care needs to be taken in 
formulating individual cases.
Formal protection for eight years is possible under SACU. If an 
industry would generate production of raw materials as well as value 
added in processing/manufacturing giving a high ratio of Swazi content
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to total value and if over eight years economies of scale and 
learning were likely to bring costs down substantially, use of these 
provisions would be appropriate. While- the general bias should be 
against widespread use of this approach, individual cases deserve 
consideration on their merits.
Government Purchasing Policy
Government is a major market for industrial products and construction. 
It is appropriate to organise its purchasing policy to give reasonable 
support to local producers and, in particular, small Swazi ones. 
Certain problems arise: orders are placed with times of delivery too 
short to allow smaller firms (or even larger local firms) to meet them 
whereas RSA suppliers can ship from stock;tenderers are asked for large 
chunks of construction or goods supply, limiting the possibility of 
smaller firms to tender; there does not appear to be adequate 
attention to how advance payments or assistance in servicing bank credit 
could assist small firms in acquiring the working capital needed to 
carry out contracts which are large relative to the suppliers' normal 
(previous) scale of operations.
Certain procedural changes can contribute to overcoming these problems
(i) Programmes, projects and lists of goods should be broken down into 
components in as much detail as possible as soon as they are 
approved, e.g. education projects should be broken down to 
individual buildings (and subcontracts for large structures), 
furniture items, etc. Information should be given to Commerce and 
Industries and public-sector promotional/support bodies in touch 
with small firms and craftsmen to give them lead time to determine 
what they potentially can tender - offer.
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(ii) Procedures should allow tenders for all or part of an item - 
e.g. 50 tables out of a total requirement of 100 - and should 
be called as long before the delivery date as is practicable 
to accommodate the needs of potential small scale suppliers.
(iii) Where practicable delivery and payment should be phased - e.g.
50 tables at 10 per month over 5 months - to minimise the 
working capital requirements of small suppliers. Progress 
payments procedures in respect to construction contracts should 
be reviewed with the same objective in mind.
(iv) Purchasing departments should examine specifications to adapt 
them to include local producers to the extent consistent with 
the actual use of the product. Specifying by brand names, 
quality of finish, etc., necessarily biases the procedure 
toward large, sophisticated South African firms.
(v) Procedures for purchasing standard items - e.g. school 
furniture supplies - which are regularly needed as part of 
recurrent operations should be examined with a view to making 
them articulate better with the capacity of medium and smallr 
scale domestic producers. For example, if adequate stocks of 
these items are held by government stores, then purchases can 
more easily be put on a steady flow basis with monthly 
deliveries and individually small contracts.
(vi) The implications of government contracts for working capital 
requirements and sources of small enterprises and craftsmen 
should be studied. Progress payments can lower but not eliminate
the need to lay out funds in advance of receipts (e.g. wages, 
raw materials, transport, interest) which often hamper 
tenders (and satisfactory performance of contracts) by small 
firms even when they have the physical capacity to produce 
and deliver on schedule.
Government contracts should be usable as a basis on which to 
borrow working capital whether from a public body related to 
small and medium scale production or from a bank. Whether this 
is now feasible, whether small producers are aware of the 
possibility and how any gaps can be filled should be examined 
jointly by Planning and Commerce and Industries.
Petroleum Products
Petroleum products are currently imported entirely from the Republic 
although the bulk are shipped via Maputo (indeed via storage tanks 
adjacent to the Mozambique refinery). Direct shipments have, 
historically, been by road tanker from the Rand, an expensive 
alternative necessitated by inadequate storage capacity in Swaziland 
(variously estimated at 12 to 20 days) and, in recent years, somewhat 
erratic service on Mozambique Railways. Presumably, in the future, 
rail shipments via Lavumisa may be substituted for road tanker 
shipment and/or the Maputo route.
On the face of it this is a surprising area of dependence. South 
Africa is very far from self-sufficiency in petroleum. Even on 
completion of Sasol III (late 1980s) and assuming a substantial 
ethanol programme, self-sufficiency except under conditions of 
rationing (including severe cuts in exports to BLS) by 1990 seems
highly unlikely. Nor is South Africa a low-cost source of supply.
While her precise oil sources are secret and she may be securing some 
oil direct from one or two producing countries, it is known that much 
of the oil is bought on the "spot market" at R4 to R8 a barrel above 
the normal contract price, a 10-25% cost premium. Nor is South Africa 
necessarily a dependable source of supply in the medium run. Events 
which could make her unwilling or unable to supply Swaziland, while by 
no means certain, are not unlikely, e.g. oil sanctions, refinery 
sabotage, transport difficulties in the Republic, denial of access to 
transit facilities in Mozambique ...
Nor are alternatives absent. The Maputo refinery is operating well 
below capacity; Mozambique is eager to contract-refine for export to 
Swaziland, Lesotho and Malawi. Swaziland could - directly or through 
the Mozambique refinery - purchase oil directly from one or more OPEC 
members. (Mozambique and Tanzania, for example, purchase directly 
from Iraq.)
However, there are reasons why the alternatives have not to date been 
pursued. First, the oil companies prefer the established South African 
connection. Given their ownership of RSA refineries and their somewhat 
strained relations with Mozambique, this is not surprising. It is 
very doubtful that they would refuse to distribute products supplied 
to them from the Maputo refinery were Swaziland to make and insist on 
such arrangements, but they cannot be expected to take the lead. 
Second, Mozambique has to date suggested payment for oil and refinery 
fees on arrival of the crude oil at Maputo. This would appear to be 
open to negotiation. In respect to the oil, Swaziland could probably 
secure extended (say 90 days) payment facilities from at least some
OPEC states (e.g. Iraq) if it buys directly. Bank credit could be 
used in respect to the refining fee. Third, there would be residuals 
(heavy furnace oil, etc.,) which could not be used in Swaziland and 
would need to be resold. This is a straightforward commercial problem.
The Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation has handled re-exports 
successfully and could probably provide details on ways and means. A 
reputable specialist broker could be retained as selling agent while 
the Maputo refinery could handle the physical side of the operation.
The case for more intensive attempts to develop alternative 
petroleum sources appears to be strong. They should - even allowing 
for a possibly higher refinery fee and interest on higher stocks in 
Swaziland - be cheaper than RSA supplies (at R5 per barrel on total 
import's savings would exceed R4 million). In addition they would increase
Swaziland's room for manoeuvre and provide a safeguard against 
interruption of South African supplies.
There is no need to switch 100%, straight away. Indeed, to limit problems 
during the running-in period of the new arrangements, an initial 
50-50 division has a good deal to be said for it. To achieve this 
would require:
ta) Greater storage capacity in Swaziland (60 to 90 days). This is 
desirable in any case as a reserve against interruption of 
supplies. Botswana experience indicates that aid for construction 
of tanks and the initial reserve stock can be secured.
( W  Arranging a team of Swaziland ministers/officials with expert 
technical and commercial advice to negotiate with Mozambican 
authorities and oil-supplying state bodies.
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(c) Making clear to the oil companies that Swaziland would from a 
given date supply 50% of their sales requirements (at fixed 
quantities adjusted annually to approximate 50%). As they have 
accepted sucn action (ana indeed 100% supply by tne scatsi m  
other countries there is no reason to suppose this would lead 
to a crisis, though there would be a good deal of grumbling and 
possibly some blustering.
As indicated in our Interim Report a refinery in Swaziland is 
not viable. It would need to export at least two-thirds of its 
output - presumptively to RSA. Further, while residual oil is 
reexportable from the coast, it would not be economic to ship 
it back to Durban or Maputo and there is no market for additional 
heavy oil products in the Rand. Indeed, proposals for a refinery 
in Swaziland are likely, in fact, to be based on broadening South 
Africa's access to petroleum and to increase Swaziland's risks 
in the events of sanctions.
General Imports
It should be stressed that what we are proposing is not elimina­
tion of imports from South Africa. Except under abnormal cir- «
cumstances RSA is the natural source for a large proportion of
7
Swaziland's imports. To suddenly redirect these imports would
v
be expensive. If it is to be done either in an emergency or 
as a result of a deliberate decision by Swaziland there must 
first be systematic capacity to locate, purchase, bring in and 
market goods from other sources. That capacity dees not now 
exist. The least expensive and most practical way to create it 
would appear t.o be by a commercial venture specializing initially 
in goods which could be procured more cheaply or at the same cost
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from sources other than the Republic of South Africa. Such a 
venture should aim to purchase about 8-10% of imports within 
three years of starting operations. Its performance should be 
judged by its success in cost-cutting, and in diversification 
away from RSA. No power of monopoly procurement, and nothing 
like a "Central Importing Agency", is proposed here.
Similarly these proposals do not assume prior withdrawal of 
Swaziland from SACU. As Chapter III suggests, such withdrawal 
would be very expensive i_f Swaziland had no import-sector infra­
structure independent of RSA ar.d continued to import from the 
Republic at Republic domestic market (not the lower export market) 
prices. An independent import capacity is a critical step toward 
broadening Swaziland's options in respect to SACU and toward 
being able to avoid severe shortages and losses if external 
events force her to withdraw. However, it is true that the scope 
for procurement from non-RSA sources would be broader outside 
SACU than in it. The South African tariff and import licensing 
system are overtly protective and therefore mean that many goods 
cheaper c.i.f. from other sources are no longer cheaper after 
duty is added.
Some Difficulties
It is not possible to diversify import sources via the present 
commercial sector. Most importers are branches of South African 
firms or so closely linked to them as to amount to the same thing. 
They simply do not have the knowledge or the contacts to locate 
alternative supplies. Further in most cases they are too small 
for a global procurement system to be viable.
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There are exceptions. Public and joint venture enterprises and 
very large private ones (e.g. Libby's, Usutu Pulp) could operate 
broader procurement policies. SEBs experience suggests this 
would pay and would lead to at least some non-RSA purchases. 
Swaziland might well consider advising these large concerns to 
adopt such a policy. However, their response (except presump- * 
tively for public sector enterprises) is not certain and their 
purchases do not constitute the bulk of imports.
Nor is it feasible to develop a globally-oriented import capacity 
through the Swazi private sector. Swazi businessmen, no matter 
how shrewd and competent in local retailing or wholesaling, have 
neither the experience, the contacts, the scale nor the specialised 
expertise to import direct except from the closest and most easily 
known source - i.e. South Africa.
A purely public sector commercial enterprise would, in principle, 
be feasible. The capital required (say E 15-17^ million including 
supplier and bank credit) is not prohibitive. Relatively efficient 
and profitable state commercial enterprises exist in a number of 
African states.
A
However, several disadvantages to such an approach can also be v *
3
cited:
»
(i) There are no citizens in the public sector with external 
trade expertise;
(ii) There is a general shortage of citizen managers for public 
sector and joint venture enterprises;
(iii) Given the lack of prior experience, Swaziland would find it 
difficult to recruit a competent and honourable team of 
expatriate managers. There is literally no-one in the
- 65 -
public service who could prepare adequate job descriptions, 
work out satisfactory contracts, evaluate curriculum vitae, 
interview candidates for these particular posts;
(iv) The Swaziland government has a clear policy of preferring
the joint venture approach in respect to new large-scale 
commercial enterprises.
Again in principle, it might be possible to encourage a new, 
European based foreign trade house to establish a subsidiary 
in Swaziland. The general Swaziland policy toward new 100% 
foreign private firms is not negative.
However, again several practical disadvantages arise, apart 
from the stated policy of encouraging joint ventures where 
feasible.
(i) Without the certainty of government support (especially
against "ganging up" and dumping by RSA firms), no serious
commercial house is likely to view the prospects as attrac­
tive;
(ii) Under certain circumstances Swaziland may wish to use the 
enterprise for specific purchasers (e.g. government and/or 
aid contract related ones) or specific purposes which 
either are not commercially ideal or which yield very large 
profits to the firm. In either case a joint venture is 
likely to be preferable to a totally private firm.
A Possible Approach
The most practicable approach would appear to be through a joint 
venture owned 5C-50 by Swaziland (through an appropriate public-
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sector entity) and a European-based foreign trading house. This 
could ensure global procurement expertise, international commer­
cial expertise and availability of suitable expatriate staff. At 
least in respect to the Swaziland end of the operation*, a train­
ing programme for Swazi's to become managers in the future should 
be part of the initial design.
mmH
Initially the firm would aim at a moderate proportion of total 
imports - perjiaps 10% or E30 million. It is likely that up to 
that proportion of imports could be secured as cheaply or more 
cheaply from sources other than RSA even assuming continued 
membership in SACU. Combining the advantages of bulk buying 
(aggregating orders by several domestic customers) and identifying 
lines e.g. in textiles, garments, consumer durables, machinery, 
in which RSA is not competitive should provide an adequate commer­
cial base. Further, in the case of goods (eg. tools and saws for 
the Forestry sector) now imported via South Africa, direct impor­
tation would appear to offer substantial cost savings. Govern­
ment, public sector enterprise and other joint venture purchases 
should provide an initial base. This does not imply they should 
be compulsorily routed to this firm, but that it should be given 
the first or at least an equal chance of locating a low-cost • *
A -  tsource,
?
Some problems may arise on the consumer goods side. Many com­
mercial enterprises - e.g. most of those in the Swazi Plaza -
* Overseas, there is a strong case for using the foreign firm's 
general information and procurement system on a negotiated 
charge basis. Therefore, while it is desirable that Swazis 
be trained in this end of the operation, it may be less crucial 
to begin such training immediately.
may not be willing to purchase non-RSA goods even if they are 
cheaper. This means that special attention will need to be paid 
to developing sales to second line and small (and especially Swazi) 
retailers and wholesalers. Such efforts may require support from 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industries. More positively, they 
would also be of assistance to any programme the Ministry might 
launch to assist in building up Swazi expertise and stake in retail­
ing and wholesaling.
An enterprise of the size envisaged might need E15-17^ million 
assets/liabilities and capital.
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1 . Warehouses, Offices, Vehicles E 2k to 5 millioi
2. Stocks (including goods in transit) E 10 million
3. Credit to Purchasers E 2k million
E 15-1735 million
1 . Equity Capital E 2 to 5 million
2. Long Term Loan E 2 to 5 million
3. Commercial Credit (90-180 day) E 5 million
4. Bank Overdraft E 5 million
The bank overdraft can be financed domestically. Presumably the 
loan can also be secured from a public sector financial institution. 
With a reputable partner, the commercial credit from suppliers 
should be available. The equity (and if desired the long term 
loan) would be subscribed 50-50 by the joint ventures' two owners.
Some Preliminary Steps
Before setting up a venture it would be advisable for Swaziland to
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secure three preliminary studies:
(i) A detailed study of the fiscal, import control and unofficial 
("moral suasion" by state, private control) restrictions on 
imports from outside the Republic. A single expert - possibly 
from the GATT/UNCTAD International Trade Centre in Geneva -
working with the relevant Treasury and Customs officials could r
"
do this in two to three months. -
(ii) A study of which goods were likely to be cheaper or about the , 
same cost after duty and what were the low cost sources is 
needed to estimate the potential scope for the firm. This 
requires both data on c.i.f. costs to Swaziland from RSA 
sources (which can be collected as part of the first study)
and knowledge (or ability to acquire it) on international 
prices. Again the GATT/UNCT A D  International Trad^SentrefW&uld 
appear an appropriate source of technical assistance. This 
study could usefully feed into the detailed analysis of the 
price input of SACU, vis-a-vis alternative tariff structures., 
proposed above.
(iii) A study of the requirements for such a firm - warehouses and 
vehicles, senior personnel, training programmes for staff 
capital required, credit policy - is needed. This should be 
supplemented by rough estimates of profitability and a short * 
list of potential partners. This study can best be done 
either by an actual commercial enterprise or by an individual ■
with considerable managerial experience in the field. In 
the former category, the Scandinavian Wholesale Cooperative 
Federation (the largest single importer in Scandinavia and a 
thriving concern) is a possible candidate. Their services 
might be procured via technical assistance from one of the 
Nordic States (Denmark, Norway, Sweden or Finland). It might 
be possible for CFTC to locate an individual consultant for
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a three month period if the second approach is thought 
preferable.
These studies are critical to ensure that any enterprise is launched 
on a viable basis. The present study does not, and cannot, go into 
enough detail for that. In principle this work could be left to the 
prospective partner. However, that has three disadvantages:
(i) Studies 1 and 2 provide data which make it much easier for a 
prospective partner to decide whether it is interested and 
should help interest firms which might otherwise be dubious.
(ii) All three studies provide data Swaziland needs to negotiate 
effectively. Without independent data, Swaziland is likely 
to end with joint venture arrangements more favourable to the 
private partner and less favourable to Swaziland than are 
necessary.
(iii) Until independent expert advice is secured, Swaziland is likely 
to be uncertain as to the bona fides of prospective partners. 
Several past experiences with partners and management agents 
(e.g. the shipping line), point to the value of having indepen­
dent advice in this respect before concluding a joint venture 
agreement.
Related Issues
Once the firm is established, thought can be given to selective 
expansion. One field might be exports. It seems likely that new
markets for some wood products (e.g. mine pit props) and some
manufactures (e.g. Tinkabi tractors, TV sets) could be located by a 
trading company with on-going global contacts. Further such a 
company would be more interested than Peak Timbers in finding new
markets and better placed than the TV company itself to do so in
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other independent African states in the region.
Eoth Botswana and Swaziland may be interested in a relatively 
similar approach to import diversification. If this turns out to be 
the case co-ordination between Swaziland and Botswana might be 
mutually beneficial. First, together they could negotiate better
£
terms with any prospective partner. Second, the larger total orders 
which could be placed would probably allow winning larger discounts 
on some items. The co-ordination need not - probably should not - 
imply a single, three-way, joint venture, but rather that the 
Swaziland and the Botswana joint venture each has the same foreign 
partner, and builds up a set of working arrangements on pooling of 
information and bulking of orders. If Swaziland decides to pursue 
exploration of the joint venture option further it would be approp­
riate to contact Botswana to determine whether their thinking is 
along similar lines and, if so, to discuss possible areas of 
co-ordination.
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T E R M S  O F  R E F E R E N C E  FOR A STU D Y ON T H I :  D EP E N D E N C E  O F  T H E
IL L .S . ECONOMIBS ON Till': REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA____________
( For' lire Into r im and F i l ia l  Repor l )
The Governments of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (the B .L . S. 
countries) have reviewed their economic situation within the context of the 
Southern African region and have resolved jointly to commission an immediate 
study which will seek to quantify their economic dependence on the Republic 
of South Africa and recommend positive measures to assist their economic 
development in the light of changes occurring in the region.
2. Accordingly, the three Governments have determined upon the following 
terms of reference for the study
(i) To identify, define and quantify the extent of dependence 
of the B . L .  S. economics on the Republic of South Africa, 
with special reference to internal and external trade, 
energy, food and other essential supplies, employment, 
communications and services (such as construction, main­
tenance, distribution and finance) and where possible, 
measures that would progressively reduce the depen­
dence of the B. L - S. economies on the Republic of South 
Africa.
(ii) To identify measures to counter adverse factors which 
currently impede industrial development and investment 
in the B. L.  S. countries and contribute positively to 
accelerated industrial developmenl and investment in 
the B . L .  S. countries.
(iii) To identify measures of a preparatory and contingency
planning nature, to be taken by the B. L. S. Governments, 
that would strengthen the ability of the economies of the 
B. L. S. countries to withstand the effects of international 
sanctions against the Republic of South Africa and of 
whatever retaliatory measures the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa might introduce with particular 
reference to : -
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GO Tho Southern Africa Customs Union arrangements;
(b) Fiscal and Monetary relationships;
(c) The availability of oil and olhcr essential supplies, and
(d) The multiplier effect on the B. L. S. economies of a 
likely resultant recession in the Republic of South 
Africa.
(iv) To examine the potential implications on the B . L . S .  economies 
of the recent South African legislation that empowers the 
Minister of Economic Affairs to have complete control over 
industrial production, with particular reference to those 
products that arc of importance to the B . L . S .  economies.
3. The Governments of the B . L .  S. countries consider such a study to be 
of (he utmost importance and urgency and wish, therefore, to be in possession 
of the rcporl of the study as soon as possible.
4 - 10 copies of an interim report and 20 copies of a final report shall be
submitted simultaneously to each of the following:
The Secretary for External Affairs
Private Bag 1
GABORONE
Botswana
The Permanent Secretary  
Ministry of Finance 
P.O.  Box MS630 
MASERU 
Lesotho
The Permanent Secretary
Ministry of Industry, Mines and Tourism
P.O.  Box 451
MBABANE
Swaziland
